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Leibniz	on	Monadic	Agency	and	Optimal	Form1	
	by		JEFFREY	K.	MCDONOUGH	(HARVARD)			“…	the	principle	of	perfection	is	not	limited	to	the	general	but	descends	also	to	the	particulars	of	things	and	of	phenomena	…	in	this	respect	it	closely	resembles	the	method	of	optimal	forms	…	For	in	these	forms	or	figures	the	optimum	is	found	not	only	in	the	whole	but	also	in	each	part,	and	it	would	not	even	suffice	in	the	whole	without	this.	…	It	is	in	this	way	that	the	smallest	parts	of	the	universe	are	ruled	in	accordance	with	the	order	of	greatest	perfection;	otherwise	the	whole	world	would	not	be	so	ruled.”2			 		 Introduction		 It	is	tempting	to	suppose	of	Leibniz’s	account	of	monadic	agency	what	many	have	supposed	of	his	philosophy	in	general,	namely,	that	in	spite	of	being	full	of	intriguing	insights,	positions,	and	arguments,	its	elements	ultimately	fail	to	form	a	coherent,	unified	system.		And,	indeed,	it	should	be	conceded	that	grounds	for	doubting	the	systematicity	of	Leibniz’s	thought	are	especially	strong	in	the	case	of	monadic	agency.		As	we	will	see	in	greater	detail	below,	he	appears	to	endorse	contradictory	views	on	the	nature	of	monadic	teleology;	his	account	of	creaturely	appetition	has	seemed	to	many	manifestly	untenable;	and	it	remains	far	from	clear	how	even	the	most	basic	threads	of	his	psychology	might	be	consistently	woven	together.			Someone	who	had	encountered	only	Leibniz’s	writings	on	the	agency	of	finite	minds	might	understandably	take	him	to	be	a	sporadically	insightful,	but	not	very	coherent	thinker.			
                                                1	Earlier	versions	of	this	paper	were	presented	to	audiences	at	the	University	of	Cincinnati,	Ohio;	Texas	A&M,	College	Station;	Ghent	University,	Belgium;	University	of	Turku,	Finland;	Humboldt	Universität	zu	Berlin,	The	Institute	of	Philosophy,	School	of	Advanced	Study,	London;	The	American	Philosophical	
Association,	Boston.	I	am	grateful	for	the	feedback	from	audience	members	at	those	events	and	especially	for	extended	discussions	with	Christian	Barth,	Donald	Rutherford,	and	Alison	Simmons.	2	“…	la	perfection	au	lieu	de	se	borner	seulement	au	general,	descend	aussi	dans	le	particulier	des	choses	et	des	phenomenes,	et	qu’il	en	est	à	peu	pres	comme	dans	la	Methode	de	Formis	Optimis	…	Car	ee	meilleur	de	ces	formes	ou	figures	ne	s’y	trouve	pas	seulement	dans	le	tout,	mais	encor	dans	chaque	partie,	et	même	il	ne	seroit	pas	d’assez	dans	le	tout	sans	cela.	…	C’est	ainsi	que	les	moindres	parties	de	l’univers	sont	reglées	suivant	l’ordre	de	la	plus	grande	perfection;	autrement	le	tout	ne	le	seroit	pas.”	Tentamen	Anagogicum,	Essay	Anagogique	dans	la	
recherche	des	causes,	GP	VII,	272-273;	translated	by	L.	Loemker	in	Philosophical	
Papers	and	Letters,	Second	Edition,	Dordrecht,	1969,	p.	478.		
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The	present	essay	aims	to	counter	this	impression	of	disarray	in	Leibniz’s	thinking	about	monadic	agency	by	drawing	on	a	seemingly	distant	notion	developed	primarily	in	his	mathematical	and	scientific	studies,	namely,	his	notion	of	an	optimal	form.		Towards	that	end,	the	first	section	introduces	Leibniz’s	understanding	of	an	optimal	form	through	his	work	on	the	technical	problem	of	determining	the	shape	of	catenaries,	that	is,	the	shape	of	freely	hanging	cords	suspended	at	both	ends.		The	second	section	argues	that	Leibniz’s	notion	of	an	optimal	form	provides	him	with	a	surprisingly	elegant	model	for	reconciling	two	forms	of	teleology	he	ascribes	to	monads.		The	third	section	teases	out	three	ways	in	which	monads	may	nonetheless	pursue	courses	of	action	that	are	in	various	senses	sub-optimal	and	defends	Leibniz	against	a	famous	objection	made	by	Pierre	Bayle.		Finally,	the	fourth	section	argues	that	Leibniz’s	notion	of	an	optimal	form	even	provides	him	with	a	rather	ingenious	picture	of	how	reason	might	play	a	role	in	the	goal-directed	unfolding	of	finite	minds.		The	essay	concludes	by	briefly	returning	to	the	recently	much-debated	question	of	whether	Leibniz	was	or	was	not	a	systematic	philosopher.		 1.	Optimal	Form	and	the	Catenary		 Throughout	his	career,	Leibniz	was	acutely	interested	in	natural	phenomena	that	could	be	treated	as	instances	of	“optimal	form.”		In	the	most	straightforward	cases,	an	optimal	form	is	a	shape,	configuration,	or	process	that	maximizes	or	minimizes	some	relevant	quantity	in	nature.	Thus	to	take	three	examples	considered	by	Leibniz,	a	drop	of	liquid	immersed	in	another	liquid	will,	under	appropriate	conditions,	take	on	an	optimal	form	–	a	spherical	shape	–	that	maximizes	its	volume	with	respect	to	its	surface	area.3	Similarly,	a	ray	of	light	reflected	off	a	mirror	will	travel	along	an	optimal	path	–	typically	a	bent	line	minimizing	time	and	distance	–	from	its	light	source	to	its	sink	(e.g.	from	a	candle	to	an	eye).4	Finally,	a	stiff	beam	loaded	with	a	heavy	weight	will	generally	distort	until	it	assumes	an	optimal	form	that	minimizes	its	overall	“stress”	energy.5		Through	investigation	of	such	phenomena,	Leibniz,	together	with	a	handful	of	leading	philosophers	and	scientists	of	the	seventeenth	century,	helped	to	pioneer	a	way	of	approaching	nature	that	led,	in	the	hands	of	those	such	as	Euler,	LaGrange	and	Jacobi,	to	the	rational	mechanics	of	the	eighteenth	century,	and	the	founding	of	the	calculus	of	variations	proper,	a	powerful	way	of	approaching	natural	phenomena	still	widely	used	today	throughout	the	natural	sciences.6	
                                                3	De	rerum	originatione	radicali,	GP	VII,	303-304;	see	also	GP	VII,	290,	§	10.			4	Tentamen	Anagogicum,	GP	VII	270-279;	see	also	Unicum	Opticae,	Catoptricae	&	
Dioptricae	Principium,	Dutens	pp.	145-150.	5Demonstrationes	Novae	de	Resistentia	Solidorum,	GM	VI,	106-112.		6	For	an	overview	of	the	history	of	eighteenth	century	rational	mechanics	and	the	development	of	the	variational	calculus,	see	H.	Goldstine,	A	History	of	the	Calculus	
of	Variations	from	the	17th	through	the	19th	Century,	Berlin	1980;	D.	Lemons,	
Perfect	Form:		Variational	Principles,	Methods,	and	Applications	in	Elementary	
Physics,	Princeton	1997;	E.	Mach,	The	Science	of	Mechanics,	T.	McCormack	(trans.),	La	Salle,	Illinois	1989;	C.	Truesdell,	The	Rational	Mechanics	of	Flexible	or	
Elastic	Bodies	1638-1788,	Birkhäuser	1980;	R.	Woodhouse,	A	History	of	the	
Calculus	of	Variations	in	the	Eighteenth	Century,	New	York	1810;	W.	Yourgrau	
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In	1690,	Leibniz’s	attention	was	drawn	to	a	particularly	interesting	instance	of	optimal	form.	In	the	May	edition	of	the	Acta	eruditorum	of	that	year,	James	Bernoulli,	having	replied	to	a	challenge	issued	in	the	previous	year,	proposed	in	turn	a	new	challenge:	“find	the	curve	assumed	by	a	loose	string	hung	freely	from	two	fixed	points	…	[assuming]	the	string	is	a	line	which	is	easily	flexible	in	all	parts.”7	Leibniz	replied	almost	immediately	to	Bernoulli’s	test,	announcing	in	the	following	June	edition	that	he	had	successfully	used	his	differential	calculus	as	a	“key”	to	unlock	the	mystery.		In	order	“to	give	time	also	to	others	for	exercising	their	skill,”	he	nonetheless	withheld	his	solution	promising	that	“if	no	one	indicates	before	the	end	of	the	year	that	he	has	found	a	solution,	I	will	give	mine,	God	willing.”8		In	the	event,	two	other	solutions	were	purposed	in	addition	to	Leibniz’s,	one	by	Christiaan	Huygens	and	one	by	Johann	Bernoulli,	James’s	younger	brother.	Collectively,	the	solutions	served	to	highlight	two	central	features	of	catenaries	(as	they	were	first	called	by	Huygens)	that	will	be	especially	relevant	for	the	discussion	that	follows.			First,	under	the	simplified	conditions	assumed	in	Bernoulli’s	challenge,	the	shape	of	a	catenary	as	a	whole	may	be	treated	as	an	optimal	form	in	the	sense	that	freely	hanging	cords	suspended	at	both	ends	will	assume	a	shape	that	maximizes	the	overall	descent	of	the	cord	as	a	whole.		Put	in	more	modern	terms,	and	conversely	as	it	were,	the	shape	of	a	catenary	is	the	shape	that	minimizes	the	total	potential	energy	of	a	freely	hanging	cord	in	a	state	of	constrained	equilibrium	as	in	Figure	1.				
	 										 		 																			Figure	1	 	 	 	 Figure	2		
                                                                                                                                       and	S.	Mandelstam,	Variational	Principles	in	Dynamics	and	Quantum	Theory,	
Third	Edition,	London	1968.	For	a	highly	accessible	introduction	to	applications	of	optimal	form	in	nature,	see	S.	Hildebrandt	and	A.	Tromba,	Mathematics	and	
Optimal	Form,	New	York	1985.	7	“Problema	vicissim	proponendum	hoc	esto:	Invenire,	quam	curvam	referat	funis	laxus	et	inter	duo	puncta	fixa	libere	suspensus.		Sumo	autem,	funem	esse	lineam	in	omnibus	suis	partibus	facillime	flexilem.”		J.B.	Bernoulli,	“J.	B.	Analysis	
problematic	antehac	propositi,	de	inventione	lineae	descensus	a	corpore	gravi	
percurrendae	uniformiter,	sic	ut	temporibus	aequalibus	aequales	altitudines	
emitiantur:		et	alterius	cuiusdam	Problematis	Propositio,”	in:	Acta	Eruditorum	(1690),	p.	219;	cited	in	C.	Truesdell,	The	Rational	Mechanics	of	Flexible	or	Elastic	
Bodies	1638-1788,	Zurich,	p.	64.		8	“…	si	ante	anni	exitum	nemo	solutionem	a	se	repertam	esse	significabit,	ego	meam	Deo	volente	dabo.”		G.W.	Leibniz,	“G.	G.	L.	ad	ea,	quae	vir	clarissimus	J.	B.	
mense	Majo	nupero	in	his	Actis	publicavit,	Responsio,”	in:	Acta	eruditorum	(1690),	p.	360;	cited	in	C.	Truesdell,	The	Rational	Mechanics	of	Flexible	or	Elastic	Bodies	
1638-1788,	Zurich,	p.	64.		
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It	is	important	to	note	that	a	catenary	does	not	typically	maximize	the	descent	of	every	individual	segment.		One	might,	for	example,	further	decrease	the	potential	energy	of	the	middle	segment	of	the	cord	depicted	in	Figure	1	by	pulling	on	the	middle	of	the	cord	as	in	Figure	2.		Doing	so,	however,	will	cause	other	segments	of	the	cord	to	ascend,	and	indeed	to	ascend	in	a	way	that	will	more	than	compensate	for	the	decline	of	the	middle	segment.		It	is	for	this	reason	that	a	cord	that	is	disturbed	from	a	state	of	equilibrium	will	oscillate	in	such	a	way	as	to	regain	its	former	shape,	the	shape	in	which	its	potential	energy	is	minimized	(that	is,	of	course,	under	an	intuitive	range	of	parameters,	the	cord	can’t	be	so	disturbed	that	it	breaks	or	kinks	for	example).						Second,	it	is	a	demonstrable	feature	of	catenaries	that	every	segment	of	a	catenary	is	itself	a	catenary.		If,	for	example,	we	allow	Figure	3	to	represent	a	catenary	ACDB,	then	the	cord	CD	in	Figure	4,	resulting	from	releasing	the	cord	from	points	A	and	B,	will	also	represent	a	catenary.9			
									 																																				Figure	3	 	 		 	 				Figure	4															It	is	perhaps	easiest	to	see	why	this	should	be	so	by	reductio:	if	every	segment	of	a	catenary	did	not	itself	minimize	its	potential	energy	under	the	given	constraints,	then	it	would	be	possible	to	alter	or	replace	that	segment	so	that	the	potential	energy	of	the	catenary	would	be	less	even	assuming	the	same	conditions.		On	pain	of	allowing	that	a	cord	might	realize	a	potential	energy	less	than	its	minimum	value,	every	segment	of	a	catenary	must	therefore	itself	be	a	catenary.			 In	examples	like	the	catenary,	Leibniz	saw	the	possibility	of	an	intriguing	and	powerful	model	of	teleology	at	work	within	the	natural	world.		From	the	vantage	provided	by	the	notion	of	an	optimal	form,	it	is	possible	to	explain	the	resting	shape	of	a	hanging	cord	in	terms	of	a	consequence	of	that	shape,	and	the	behavior	of	a	disturbed	chain	in	terms	of	the	outcome	of	its	behavior,	thus	making	possible	putatively	teleological	explanations	of	the	resting	shape	and	restoring	movements	of	hanging	cords.		Such	prima	facie	teleological	explanations	were	especially	enticing	to	Leibniz	because	they	promised	to	put	explanations	in	terms	of	final	“causes”	or	reasons	on	a	mathematical,	predictive,	and	even	lawful	par	with	efficient,	mechanical	explanations:		appealing	to	the	notion	of	an	optimal	form,	Leibniz	could	predict,	for	examples,	the	shape	of	a	freely	hanging	cord,	or	the	trajectory	of	a	ray	of	light,	and	in	principle	the	shape	
                                                9	In	a	strictly	parallel	case,	Leibniz	himself	notes	that	every	sub-path	of	a	path	of	quickest	descent	must	itself	be	a	path	of	quickest	descent.		See	Tentamen	
Anagogicum,	GP	VII,	272-3.			
 5 
of	a	bent	beam,	with	the	same	precision	as	any	mechanist	could	hope	to	predict	the	outcome	of	the	collision	of	a	pair	of	perfectly	elastic	spheres.	Leibniz’s	work	on	optimal	form	naturally	raises	deep	and	difficult	questions	within	what	we	might	think	of	as	his	philosophy	of	science.	How	are	examples	of	optimal	form	related	to	more	traditional	as	well	as	current	views	on	teleology?		How	are	we	to	understand	the	relationship	between	explanations	in	terms	of	optimal	form	and	explanations	in	terms	of	efficient	causes?		How	widely	can	the	sorts	of	explanations	that	Leibniz	offers	for	catenaries,	rays	of	light	and	bending	beams	be	applied	within	the	natural	sciences?		While	these	are	all,	I	think,	good	and	worthy	questions,	in	the	next	three	sections	I	would	like	to	set	them	aside	in	order	to	consider	the	influence	of	Leibniz’s	pioneering	work	on	optimal	forms	on	his	thinking	about	the	goal-directed	agency	of	finite	creatures.10		More	specifically,	I	would	like	to	suggest	that	key	structural	features	of	Leibniz’s	notion	of	an	optimal	form	are	echoed	in	his	understanding	of	the	agency	of	finite	creatures	and	lend	his	views	on	creaturely	agency	an	otherwise	elusive	coherence.		 2.	An	Unlikely	Model	of	the	Will		 On	a	standard,	and	I	think	permissible,	interpretation	of	Leibniz’s	considered	metaphysics,	the	world	is	exhaustively	constituted	by	immaterial,	mind-like	simples	–	the	“monads”	familiar	from	his	Principles	of	Nature	and	Grace	and	the	so-called	Monadology.11		Although	monads	are	metaphysical	atoms	of	a	
                                                10	I	have	taken	up	these	issues	in	J.	McDonough,	“Leibniz	on	Natural	Teleology	and	the	Laws	of	Optics,”	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	78:3	(2009),	pp.	505-544;	J.	McDonough,	“Leibniz’s	Two	Realms	Revisited,”	Nôus	42:4	(2008),	pp.	673-696;	and	J.	McDonough	“Leibniz’s	Optics	and	Contingency	in	Nature,”	
Perspectives	on	Science	18:4	(2010),	pp.	432-455.		For	related	discussion	see	also	J.	Bennett,	“Leibniz’s	Two	Realms,”	in:	D.	Rutherford	and	J.	Cover	(eds.),	Leibniz:		
Nature	and	Freedom,	Oxford	2005,	pp.	135-155;	H.	Hecht,	“Dynamik	und	Optik	bei	Leibniz,”	NTM	International	Journal	of	History	and	Ethics	of	Natural	Sciences,	
Technology	and	Medicine	4	(1996),	pp.	83-102;	M.	Roinila,	Leibniz	on	Rational	
Decision-Making,	Helsinki	2007;	M.	Stöltzner,	“Action	Principles	and	Teleology”	in:	H.	Atmanspracher	and	Gerhard	Dalenoort	(eds.),	Inside	Versus	Outside,	Berlin	1994,	pp.	33-62;	M.	Stöltzner,	“To	What	Extent	Does	Formal	Teleology	Still	Make	Sense,”	in:	M.	Féhér,	L.	Ropolyi,	and	O.	Kiss	(eds.),	Hermeneutics	and	Science,	Dordrecht	1999,	pp.	227-246;	M.	Stöltzner,	“Le	Principe	de	Moindre	Action	et	les	Trois	Ordres	de	la	Téléologie	Formelle	dans	la	Physique”	Archives	de	Philosophie	63	(2000),	pp.	621-655.		11	Although	a	great	deal	of	controversy	currently	surrounds	Leibniz’s	views	on	substance	and	fundamental	ontology,	I	take	the	discussion	here	to	be	consistent	in	essentials	with	all	the	now	major	interpretations.		For	entry	into	the	debate	over	Leibniz’s	views	on	substance,	see	R.	Adams,	Leibniz:		Determinist,	Theist,	
Idealist,	Oxford	1994;	D.	Garber,	“Leibniz	and	the	Foundations	of	Physics:		The	Middle	Years,”	in:	Kathleen	Okruhlik	and	James	Brown	(eds.),	The	Natural	
Philosophy	of	Leibniz,	Dordrecht	1985,	pp.	27-130;	D.	Garber,	Enchanting	the	
World:	Leibniz	on	Body,	Substance	and	Monad,	Oxford	2009;	D.	Rutherford,	“Leibniz	as	Idealist,”	Oxford	Studies	in	Early	Modern	Philosophy	4	(2008),	pp.	141-
 6 
sort,	Leibniz	maintains	that	each	monad	is	unique	in	virtue	of	“its	internal	qualities	and	actions,	which	can	be	nothing	but	its	perceptions	(that	is,	the	representation	of	the	composite,	or	what	is	external,	in	the	simple)	and	its	
appetitions	(that	is,	its	tendencies	to	go	from	one	perception	to	another)	which	are	the	principles	of	change.”12		Since	the	notions	of	perception	and	appetite	figure	centrally	in	Leibniz’s	account	of	human	agency,	it	should	be	helpful	to	begin	by	highlighting	a	few	of	Leibniz’s	distinctive	views	concerning	them.				 Leibniz	attributes	to	monads	far	ranging	but	not	unlimited	perceptual	capacities.		He	holds	that	each	immaterial	substance	has	“relations	that	express	all”	immaterial	substances,	so	that,	in	a	generic	sense,	each	monad	may	be	said	to	perceive	every	other	monad	in	the	created	world.13		Furthermore,	he	suggests	that	in	virtue	of	their	intrinsic	“marks	and	traces,”	each	monad	additionally	represents	not	only	everything	in	the	universe,	but	also	everything	in	the	universe	that	has	occurred	in	the	past	or	will	occur	in	the	future.14		Nonetheless,	Leibniz	recognizes	three	important	limitations	on	the	representational	capacities	of	monads.	First,	he	insists	that	each	monad	must	represent	its	entire	world	from	a	particular	point	of	view,	representing	first	and	foremost	a	particular	body	which	it	dominates,	and	the	rest	of	the	world	as	acting	more	or	less	remotely	on	that	body	in	a	universe	connected	by	time,	space,	and	causation.15	Second,	Leibniz	maintains	that	monadic	perceptions	come	in	varying	degrees	of	clarity	and	confusion	so	that	while	each	monad	must	in	some	sense	have	a	representation	of	everything	in	the	world,	nonetheless	“it	is	true	that	this	representation	is	only	confused	as	to	the	detail	of	the	whole	universe,	and	can	only	be	distinct	for	a	small	portion	of	things,	that	is,	either	those	that	are	closest,	or	for	those	that	are	greatest	with	respect	to	each	monad.”16		Finally,	third,	Leibniz	even	grants	that	most	monadic	representations	do	not	rise	to	the	level	of	conscious	awareness.17		Thus	while	he	is	committed	to	my	having,	say,	some	representation	of	the	burglar	breaking	into	the	bank	next	door,	he	is	not	
                                                                                                                                       190;	C.	Wilson,	Leibniz’s	Metaphysics:	A	Historical	and	Comparative	Study,	Princeton	1989.	12	“…	ne	sauroit	être	discernée	d’une	autre	chose	que	ses	perceptions	(c’est	à	dire,	les	representations	du	composé,	ou	de	ce	qui	est	dehors,	dans	le	simple)	et	ses	appetitions	(c’est	à	dire,	ses	tendences	d’une	perception	à	l’autre)	qui	sont	les	principes	du	changement.”	Principes	de	la	Nature	et	de	la	Grace,	fondés	en	raison	§	2	(PNG);	GP	VI,	598;	translated	by	R.	Ariew	and	D.	Garber,	G.	W.	Leibniz:	
Philosophical	Essays,	Indianapolis,	Indiana,	1989,	207;	see	also,	“Monadologie,”	§§	14-15;	GP	VI,	608-609;	GP	IV,	51;	GM	III,	552-553;	A.VI.iv.556-7.	13	“…rapports	qui	expriment	toutes	…”Monadologie	§§	56-57;	GP	VI,	607;	see	also	PNG	§	3;	GP	VI,	598-559;	GP	IV,	564.		14	See	Monadologie	§	61;	GP	VI,	617;	PNG	§13;	GP	VI,	604.			15	See	Monadologie	§	57,	§§	62-63;	GP	VI,	616,	617-618;	PNG	§	3;	GP	VI,	598-599;	GP	II,	253;	GP	IV,	532;	GP	IV,	530,	532.	16	“…	quoyqu’il	soit	vray,	que	cette	representation	n’est	que	confuse	dans	le	detail	de	tout	l’univers	et	ne	peut	être	distincte	que	dans	une	petite	partie	des	choses,	c’est	à	dire	dans	celles,	qui	sont	ou	les	plus	prochaines	ou	les	plus	grandes	par	rapport	à	chacune	des	Monades…”	Monadologie	§	60;	G	VI,	617;	Ariew	and	Garber,	p.	220.		See	also	PNG	§	13;	GP	VI,	604;	G	IV,	521.	17	See	Monadologie	§	14;	G	VI,	608-609;	G	IV,	546-547;	G	IV,	550.			
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committed	to	my	being	consciously	aware,	even	in	a	confused	way,	of	the	burglar’s	presence.		If	our	perceptions	allow	us	to	represent	the	world	around	us,	our	appetites	are,	for	Leibniz,	what	drive	our	mental	lives	forward;	they	constitute,	in	his	words,	“The	action	of	the	internal	principle	which	brings	about	change	or	passage	from	one	perception	to	another.”18		Leibniz’s	account	of	appetites	essentially	mirrors	his	account	of	perceptions.19		Just	as	our	perceptions	taken	as	a	whole	encode	information	about	the	entire	universe	from	a	given	point	of	view,	so	our	appetitions	taken	as	a	whole	lead	us	from	one	universal	representation	to	our	next	universal	representation.		Likewise,	just	as	petite	perceptions	vary	among	themselves	with	respect	to	their	distinctness	and	confusion,	so,	Leibniz	maintains,	our	tiny	inclinations	and	appetites	vary	among	themselves	with	respect	to	their	strength,	that	is,	they	vary	in	their	ability	to	effect	transitions	from	one	perceptional	state	to	another.20	Finally,	just	as	we	are	differentially	aware	of	our	various	perceptions,	so,	for	Leibniz,	we	are	also	differentially	aware	of	our	individual	appetites.		I	may	be	acutely	aware,	for	example,	of	my	desire	to	remove	my	hand	from	the	hot	stove,	but	only	faintly	aware	of	my	desire	to	scratch	the	itch	on	the	back	of	my	neck.	Indeed,	Leibniz	even	suggests	that	just	as	there	are	perceptions	falling	below	the	threshold	of	consciousness,	there	may	also	be	“minute	sufferings	of	which	we	cannot	be	aware.”21		In	speaking	of	monads	as	being	driven	by	appetites,	Leibniz	clearly	means	to	imply	that	monads	unfold	teleologically,	a	commitment	that	comes	out	
                                                18	“L’action	du	principe	interne,	qui	fait	le	changement	ou	le	passage	d’une	perception	à	une	autre	…”	Monadologie	§	15;	G	VI,	609;	Ariew	and	Garber,	p.	215.	Leibniz’s	thinking	about	appetition	has	only	recently	begun	to	receive	the	sort	widespread	attention	it	deserves.		For	important	recent	studies	on	the	topic,	see	J.	Bennett,	“Leibniz’s	Two	Realms,”	in:	D.	Rutherford	and	J.	Cover	(eds.),	Leibniz:		
Nature	and	Freedom,	Oxford	2005,	pp.	135-155;	M.	Bobro	and	K.	Clatterbaugh,	“Unpacking	the	Monad:		Leibniz’s	Theory	of	Causality,”	Monist	79	(1996),	pp.	408-425;	L.	Carlin,	“Leibniz	on	Final	Causes,”	Journal	of	the	History	of	Philosophy	44	(2006),	pp.	217-233;	J.	Carriero,	“Substance	and	Ends	in	Leibniz,”	in:	P.	Hoffman,	D.	Owen,	and	G.	Yaffe,	Contemporary	Perspectives	on	Early	Modern	
Philosophy,	Essays	in	Honor	of	Vere	Chappell,	Buffalo,	New	York	2008,	pp.	115-140;	L.	Jorgenson,	“Leibniz’s	Appetite,”	unpublished	manuscript	2011;	M.	Kulstad,	“Appetition	in	the	Philosophy	of	Leibniz,”	in:	A.	Heinekamp,	W.	Lenzen,	and	M.	Schneider	(eds.),	Mathisesis	rationis:	Festschrift	für	Heinrich	Schepers,	Münster	1990,	pp.	133-151;	M.	Lin,	“What’s	Teleological	about	Monadic	Causation?”	unpublished	manuscript	2009;	S.	Lee,	“Leibnizian	Appetites,”	unpublished	manuscript	2009;	M.	Rozemond,	“Leibniz	on	Final	Causation”	in:	S.	Newlands	and	L.	Jorgensen	(eds.),	Metaphysics	and	the	Good:		Themes	from	the	
Philosophy	of	Robert	Merrihew	Adams,	Oxford	2009,	pp.	272-294;	D.	Rutherford,	“Leibniz	on	Spontaneity,”	in:	D.	Rutherford	and	J.	Cover	(eds.),	Leibniz:	Nature	
and	Freedom,	Oxford	2005,	pp.	156-180.	19	Monadologie	§	36;	GP	VI,	612-613;	Monadologie	§	49;	GP	VI,	615.			20	Monadologie	§	15;	GP	VI,	609;	see	also	GP	IV,	546.			21	“…	des	petites	douleurs	inapperceptibles	…”	A	VI.vi,	165;	translated	by	P.	Remnant	and	J.	Bennett,	G.	W.	Leibniz:	New	Essays	on	Human	Understading,	Cambridge	1993,	p.	165.	See	also,	GP	IV,	547;	GP	IV,	550.	
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explicitly	in	his	repeated	claims	that	“perceptions	in	the	monad	arise	from	one	another	by	the	laws	of	appetites,	or	the	laws	of	the	final	causes	of	good	and	
evil.”22		As	Donald	Rutherford	has	insightfully	pointed	out,	however,	Leibniz’s	account	of	monadic	teleology	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	monads	would	seem	to	be	subject	to	at	least	two	distinguishable	teleological	laws.23		On	the	one	hand,	each	monad	seems	to	unfold	in	such	a	manner	as	to	contribute	in	its	own	specific	way	to	the	objective	optimization	of	the	created	world.		Call	this	“the	law	of	
objective	teleology.”		It	is	teleology	in	this	regard	that	seems	to	be	required	by	Leibniz’s	commitment	to	this	being	the	best	of	all	possible	worlds.		On	the	other	hand,	each	monad	also	seems	to	unfold	in	such	a	way	as	to	optimize	what	it	perceives	to	be	the	best.		Call	this	“the	law	of	subjective	teleology.”24		It	is	teleology	in	this	regard	that	seems	to	be	required	by	Leibniz’s	commitment	to	the	ancient	doctrine	that	agents	always	act	under	the	“guise	of	the	good”	–	that	is,	according	to	which	we	always	will	what	seems	to	be	best	to	us	at	the	time.25		Although	it	has	been	suggested	that	these	two	commitments	must	lead	to	various	tensions	and	inconsistencies	in	Leibniz’s	thought,	I’d	like	to	suggest	that	his	seemingly	distant	notion	of	an	optimal	form	both	provides	insight	into	his	thinking	about	the	laws	of	objective	and	subjective	teleology,	and	shows	how	he	could	reasonably	suppose	that	both	laws	might	be	universally	true.			Although	easily	overlooked,	the	actual	world	is,	for	Leibniz,	an	optimal	form	system	much	like	a	catenary	and	thus	exhibits	the	two	features	of	optimal	form	systems	highlighted	above.26		First,	just	as	a	catenary	may	be	viewed	as	a	system	that	optimizes	overall	descent	under	the	constraints	imposed	by	its	mounts,	its	tensile	strength,	etc.,	the	world	as	a	whole,	for	Leibniz,	may	be	viewed	as	a	system	that	optimizes	objective	goodness	under	the	constraints	of	what	God	can	consistently	create	–	that	is,	to	borrow	Leibniz’s	own	term,	under	the	constraints	of	compossibility.27		Without	the	constraints	of	compossibility	the	
                                                22	PNG	§3;	GP	VI,	598-599;	see	also	Monadologie	§	36;	GP	VI,	612-613;	
Monadologie	§	79;	GP	VI,	620;	G	VI,	421-423;	C	14.		23	D.	Rutherford,	“Leibniz	on	Spontaneity,”	p.	167.			24	Rutherford	calls	these	the	“law	of	natural	teleology”	(=objective	teleology)	and	“law	of	desire	teleology”	(=subjective	teleleology),	“Leibniz	on	Spontaneity,”	p.	167.		25	For	earlier	indications	of	the	doctrine	of	the	guise	of	the	good,	see	Plato’s	Meno	77a-87c	in:	The	Collected	Dialogues,	E.	Hamilton	and	H.	Cairns	(eds.),	Princeton,	1989,	pp.	360-372;	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	Book	III,	1113a-1113b	in:	The	
Complete	Works	of	Aristotle,	Jonathan	Barnes	(ed.),	Princeton	1984,	pp.	1757-1758;	Aquinas’s	Summ	Theologica,	Ia2ae,	question	8	in:	Summa	Theologica,	Fathers	of	the	English	Dominican	Province	(trans.),	Notre	Dame,	Indiana	1981,	pp.	626-628.	For	an	entry	into	current	discussions	of	both	the	doctrine’s	historical	and	contemporary	significance,	see	S.	Tenenbaum,	Desire,	Good,	and	
Practical	Reason,	Oxford	2010.	26	De	rerum	originatione	radicali,	GP	VII,	303.			27	Brown,	“Compossibility,	Harmony,	and	Perfection	in	Leibniz,”	Philosophical	
Review	96	(1987),	pp.	172-203;	J.	Cover	and	J.	O’Leary-Hawthorne,	Substance	and	
Individuation	in	Leibniz,	Cambridge	1999;	I.	Hacking,	“A	Leibnizian	Theory	of	Truth,”	in:	M.	Hooker	(ed.),	Leibniz:		Critical	and	Interpretative	Essays,	Minneapolis	1982,	pp.	185-95;	J.	Hintikka,	“Leibniz	on	Plentitude,	Relations,	and	
 9 
optimization	of	the	world	would	be	trivial,	just	as	the	optimization	of	an	unconstrained	chain	is	trivial.		Second,	just	as	each	segment	of	a	catenary	can	itself	be	viewed	as	a	system	that	maximizes	its	overall	descent	under	given	conditions,	so	too	each	monad	constituting	the	actual	world	can	be	understood	as	a	subsystem	that	maximizes	its	objective	goodness	under	the	constraints	of	compossibility.		That	this	must	be	so	can	be	seen	in	this	case	as	well	by	reductio:	If,	for	example,	Judas	could	have	been	replaced	with	a	better	counterpart	under	the	constrains	of	compossibility,	without	generating	worse	repercussions,	then	there	would	be	a	possible	world	better	than	the	best	of	all	possible	worlds.		In	virtue	of	realizing	these	two	features	of	optimal	form	systems,	both	the	actual	world	as	a	whole	and	each	monad	in	it	may	be	viewed	as	teleological	systems	that	maximize	objective	goodness	in	much	the	same	way	as	catenaries,	bending	beams	and	stretched	springs	may	be	viewed	as	teleological	systems	that	minimize	potential	energy.		Significantly,	however,	each	monad	constituting	the	actual	world	may	also	be	viewed	as	an	optimal	form	system	that	maximizes	subjective	goodness	in	a	manner	structurally	analogous	to	the	way	in	which	the	world	as	a	whole	maximizes	objective	goodness.		Thus	to	make	the	parallels	explicit:	first,	just	as	the	world	as	a	whole	maximizes	objective	goodness	under	the	constraints	of	compossibility,	so	each	monad	maximizes	subjective	goodness	under	the	constraint	that	it	represents	its	entire	world	from	a	distinct	point	of	view	and	as	being	related	to	the	body	it	dominates	by	relations	of	time,	space,	and	causation.		(For	ease	of	expression,	henceforth	I’ll	generally	refer	to	this	constraint	simply	as	the	“point	of	view”	constraint.)28		Without	this	constraint,	the	optimization	of	a	
                                                                                                                                       the	‘Reign	of	Law,”	in:	Harry	G.	Frankfurt	(ed.),	Leibniz:		A	Collection	of	Critical	
Essays,	Garden	City,	New	York	1972,	pp.	155-190;	O.	Koistinen	and	A.	Repo,	“Compossibility	and	Being	in	the	Same	World	in	Leibniz’s	Metaphysics,”	Studia	
Leibnitiana	33	(1999),	pp.	196-214;	B.	Mates,	The	Philosophy	of	Leibniz:		
Metaphysics	and	Philosophy	of	Language,	Oxford	1986,	pp.	76-78;	J.	McDonough,	“Leibniz	and	the	Puzzle	of	Incompossibility,”	The	Philosophical	Review	119:2	(2010),	pp.	135-163;	J.	Messina	and	D.	Rutherford,	“Leibniz	on	Compossibility,”	
Philosophy	Compass	4	(2009),	pp.	1–16;	N.	Rescher,	Leibniz:		An	Introduction	to	
His	Philosophy,	Lanham,	Maryland,	1979;	B.	Russell,	A	Critical	Exposition	of	the	
Philosophy	of	Leibniz,	2nd	edition,	London	1937;	D.	Rutherford,	Leibniz	and	the	
Rational	Order	of	Nature,	Cambridge	1995,	pp.	181-188;	M.	Wilson,	“Compossibility	and	Law,”	in:	Steven	Nadler	(ed.),	Causation	in	Early	Modern	
Philosophy,	University	Park,	Pennsylvania	1993,	pp.	119-33;	C.	Wilson,	“Plentitude	and	Compossibility	in	Leibniz,”	Leibniz	Review	10	(2000),	pp.	1-20.	28	The	application	of	the	law	of	subjective	teleology	is,	of	course,	less	intuitive	in	the	case	of	lower	monads.		How	could,	for	example,	a	wholly	unconscious	“mind”	always	act	under	the	guise	of	the	good?		Leibniz,	however,	I	think	intentionally	means	to	treat	the	unfolding	of	even	the	dullest	of	monads,	as	well	as	the	smartest	of	monads	in	their	dullest	respects,	on	analogy	to	the	teleological	unfolding	of	our	own,	conscious	mental	lives.		Thus,	for	example,	in	a	letter	to	Sophie	Charlotte	of	8	May	1704,	Leibniz	writes	explicitly:	Quand	nous	voyons	…	l’ame	suivre	les	loix	morales	du	bien	et	du	mal	apparent	dans	quelque	deliberation:		disons	des	autres	cas	que	nous	ne	voyons	pas	ou	que	nous	ne	demêlons	pas	si	bien,	qu’il	en	est	de	même,	et	
 10 
monad’s	subjective	goodness	would	be	trivial	–	an	agent’s	potential	pleasures	and	pains	would	in	no	way	be	limited	by	present	circumstances	or	past	actions.		Second,	just	as	each	monad	constituting	the	actual	world	can	itself	be	viewed	as	a	sub-system	that	maximizes	objective	perfection	under	the	constraints	of	compossibility,	so	each	appetite	of	a	monad	can	be	viewed	as	a	subsystem	that	maximizes	subjective	perfection	under	the	constrains	imposed	by	the	agent’s	point	of	view.		That	this	must	be	so	can	once	again	be	seen	by	reductio:	if	an	appetition	did	not	optimize	subjective	goodness	under	the	constraints	imposed	by	the	agent’s	point	of	view,	then	it	would	be	possible	for	an	agent	to	more	than	maximize	its	overall	subjective	goodness	–	to	realize	more	subjective	goodness	than	is	possible	under	the	constraints	imposed	by	its	point	of	view.		In	virtue	of	realizing	these	two	features	of	optimal	form	systems,	each	monad	as	whole,	and	each	appetite	within	it,	may	be	viewed	as	a	teleological	system	that	maximizes	subjective	goodness	in	much	the	same	way	that,	for	Leibniz,	various	physical	systems	and	the	world	as	a	whole	may	be	viewed	as	teleological	systems.	Finally,	since	the	world	as	a	whole	may	be	viewed	as	an	optimal	form	system	with	monads	as	optimized	subsystems,	and	monads	themselves	may	be	viewed	as	optimal	form	systems	with	appetites	as	subsystems,	Leibniz’s	notion	of	an	optimal	form	furnishes	him	with	an	extremely	elegant	picture	of	how	the	laws	of	objective	and	subjective	teleology	may	be	reconciled.		Viewed	from	the	top	down,	as	it	were,	monads	may	be	viewed	as	subsystems	presupposed	by	the	optimization	of	the	objective	perfection	of	the	world	as	a	whole,	and	subject	to	the	law	of	objective	teleology	insofar	as	they	unfold	in	such	a	way	as	to	collectively	optimize	the	objective	goodness	of	the	created	world	as	a	whole	under	the	constraints	of	compossibility.		Viewed	from	the	bottom	up,	however,	monads	may	also	be	viewed	as	uniquely	determined	systems	resulting	from	the	optimization	of	their	subjective	inclinations,	and	subject	to	the	law	of	subjective	teleology	insofar	as	they	unfold	in	such	a	way	as	to	individually	optimize	their	competing	subjective	inclinations	under	the	constraints	imposed	by	their	unique	points	of	view.		The	two	laws	are	reconciled	in	a	way	that	is	familiar	from	optimal	form	systems	generally,	namely,	via	the	fact	that	a	single	system	may	be	viewed	both	as	a	consequence	of	the	optimization	of	its	elements	and	as	prerequisite	of	the	optimization	of	a	more	comprehensive	system:		Just	as	a	catenary	may	be	viewed	both	as	resulting	from	the	optimization	of	its	elements,	
                                                                                                                                       que	c’est	tout	comme	icy.		C’est	à	dire,	expliquons	les	choses	dont	nous	n’avons	qu’une	connoissance	confuse,	par	celles	dont	nous	en	avons	une	distincte,	et	disons	que	….	tout	se	fait	moralement	dans	l’ame,	ou	suivant	les	apparences	du	bien	et	du	mal,	tellement	que	même	dans	nos	instincts	ou	dans	les	actions	involontaires	où	le	seul	corps	paroist	avoir	part,	il	y	a	dans	l’ame	un	appetit	du	bien	ou	une	fuite	du	mal	qui	la	pousse,	quoyque	nostre	reflexion	ne	puisse	point	en	demêler	la	confusion.		(G	III,	346-347;	see	also,	GP	IV,	510;	Principes	de	la	Nature	et	de	la	Grace	§§	4-5;	GP	VI,	599-601)	It	is	not	essential	to	the	present	account,	however,	to	insist	that	subjective	teleology	be	ascribed	to	lower	as	well	as	to	higher	monads.		Those	who	–	not	implausibly	–	think	that	lower	monads	do	not	act	under	the	guise	of	the	good	are	invited	to	take	the	present	account	as	an	account	of	how	Leibniz	may	reconcile	the	two	forms	of	teleology	he	ascribes	to	higher	monads	alone.	
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and	as	an	element	necessary	for	the	optimization	of	a	larger	cord,	so,	for	Leibniz,	each	monad	may	be	viewed	both	as	resulting	from	the	optimization	of	its	appetites,	and	as	an	element	necessary	for	the	optimization	of	the	world	as	a	whole.	Although	the	structural	analogy	just	sketched	may	seem	a	bit	abstract,	the	picture	it	suggests	of	how	monads	might	be	subject	to	both	the	laws	of	objective	and	subjective	teleology	is	actually	quite	straightforward.		In	creating	the	actual	world,	Leibniz’s	god	creates	an	infinity	of	monads,	each	of	which	must	represent	its	entire	world	from	its	own	distinct	point	of	view.		Each	monad	then	unfolds	“spontaneously”	in	accordance	with	what	appears	to	it	to	be	best	given	the	constraints	imposed	by	its	own	unique	perspective.		In	doing	so	each	monad	follows	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.		In	spontaneously	pursuing	what	appears	to	it	to	be	best	from	its	own	point	of	view,	however,	each	monad	also	makes	exactly	the	contribution	it	needs	to	make	in	order	to	play	its	specific	role	in	realizing	the	best	of	all	possible	worlds.		That	is	to	say,	the	monads	of	the	actual	world	follow	the	law	of	objective	teleology	precisely	by	following	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.29		It	might,	of	course,	seem	like	a	fantastic	coincidence	that	each	monad’s	pursuing	what	seems	subjectively	best	to	it	should	in	fact	bring	about	the	objectively	best	of	all	possible.		And,	indeed,	I	think	that	Leibniz	would	gladly	concede	that	it	would	be	a	fantastic	coincidence,	but	for	the	fact	that	an	omniscient,	benevolent	God	chose	to	create	the	monads	that	he	did	create	precisely	because	he	knew	that	their	spontaneous	unfolding	would	in	fact	bring	about	the	best	of	all	possible	worlds.		
	 3.	Non-optimal	Agency	and	Bayle’s	dog		 It	has	been	argued	thus	far	that	Leibniz’s	notion	of	an	optimal	form	helps	to	shed	light	on	his	thinking	about	how	monads	may	strive	to	optimize	their	own	subjective	perfection	while	simultaneously	contributing	to	the	objective	perfection	of	the	world	as	a	whole.		It	should	be	emphasized,	however,	that	the	various	ways	in	which	Leibniz	believes	that	monads	must	always	strive	for	perfection	are	consistent	with	their	actions	nonetheless	being	imperfect	in	various	senses.		More	specifically,	Leibniz’s	commitment	to	monads	always	being	governed	by	the	laws	of	subjective	and	objective	teleology	can	be	shown	to	be	consistent	with	their	failing	to	act	optimally	in	at	least	three	important	ways.			First,	Leibniz	can	allow	that	some	actions	of	finite	creatures	may	be	non-optimal	in	the	sense	that	they	are	performed	under	conditions	that	are	themselves	non-optimal,	at	least	from	the	perspective	of	the	agent.		As	noted	above,	Leibniz	maintains	that	every	finite	creature	wills	under	the	constraint	that	it	represent	its	entire	universe	from	its	own	distinct	point	of	view.		That	implies,	however,	that	I	might	confront	an	array	of	options	that	simply	does	not	
                                                29	It	is,	of	course,	important	not	to	confuse	the	law	of	objective	teleology	as	defined	above	with	a	law	according	to	which	each	monad	must	realize	what	is	objectively	best	for	it	per	se.		Unless	taken	to	hold	trivially	–	for	example	in	virtue	of	super	essentialism	–	Leibniz	clearly	does	not	accept	any	such	law.		In	whatever	sense	we	may	say,	for	example,	that	Judas	might	not	have	sinned,	we	may	also	say	that	it	would	have	been	better	for	Judas	per	se	had	he	not	sinned.	
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include	the	option	that	I	would	most	prefer.		I	might	really	want	a	scoop	of	strawberry	ice	cream,	but	have	to	choose	between	chocolate	and	vanilla	because	those	are	the	only	options	presented.		In	maintaining	that	finite	agents	always	will	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best,	Leibniz	should	be	understood	as	maintaining	that	they	always	will	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best	among	the	options	available	to	them,	and	he	is	quite	explicit,	for	example,	in	emphasizing	that	“The	soul	is	not	able	always	to	give	itself	pleasant	feelings,	since	the	feelings	it	has	are	dependent	on	those	it	has	had.”30			Second,	Leibniz	can	allow	that	in	optimizing	their	overall	inclinations	creatures	may	neglect	what	is	their	strongest	inclination	considered	individually.		At	the	ice	cream	store,	my	single	strongest	inclination	might	be	to	order	two	scoops	of	chocolate,	but	I	might	also	desire	a	cup	of	coffee,	be	worried	about	my	diet,	and	want	enough	change	for	the	parking	meter.		Optimizing	these	inclinations	may	well	result	in	my	compromising	my	strongest	inclination	–	I	may	order	one	scoop	instead	of	two,	get	the	coffee,	and	pay	the	meter	my	leftover	change.31		As	Leibniz	himself	points	out,	in	such	cases	my	inclinations	considered	in	isolation	may	be	likened	to	God’s	antecedent	will	which	“considers	each	good	separately	in	the	capacity	of	a	good”	while	my	optimized	will	may	be	likened	to	God’s	consequent	will	which	“results	from	the	conflict	of	all	the	antecedent	wills”	and	to	which	alone	“Success	entire	and	infallible	belongs.”32		Third,	Leibniz	can	allow	that	creatures	may	fail	to	optimize	their	own	subjective	good	due	to	their	imperfect	knowledge	of	the	world.		Thus,	for	example,	I	might	act	under	the	guise	of	the	good	in	taking	a	big	bite	of	my	ice	cream	sundae	–	I	may	perceive	that	state	of	affairs	as	the	best	overall	state	of	affairs	available	to	me.	But	I	might	be	wrong.		In	that	bite	of	sundae	there	might	be	a	hard	rock	that	I	fail	to	perceive	with	sufficient	clarity,	or	the	perception	of	which	does	not	rise	to	the	level	of	my	consciousness	before	I	break	my	tooth	on	it.		Indeed,	I	may	well	not	recognize	my	mistake	until	only	after	it	is	too	late	to	fully	avoid	the	pain	the	rock	will	cause	me	so	that	the	most	I	can	do	is	attempt	to	minimize	my	suffering,	perhaps	by	stopping	my	bite	halfway	through,	or	by	holding	my	jaw	with	my	hand,	or	even	by	going	to	the	dentist	immediately	after	the	fact.		A	creature	may	thus	optimize	what	appears	to	be	best	to	it,	and	still	
                                                30	“…	l’ame	de	se	donner	tousjours	les	sentimens	qui	luy	plaisent,	puisque	les	sentimens	qu’elle	aura,	ont	une	dependance	de	ceux	qu’elle	a	eus.”	GP	IV,	519;	translated	by	R.	Woolhouse	and	R.	Franks,	in:	Leibniz’s	“New	System”	and	
Associated	Texts,	Oxford	2006,	p.	81.	31	Incidentally,	this	concession	provides	Leibniz	with	good	resources	to	respond	to	a	familiar	objection	to	the	guise	of	the	good,	namely,	that	where	weakness	of	the	will	occurs	an	agent	may	recognize	something	as	optimal	but	nonetheless	fail	to	will	it	fully.		Because	the	Leibnizian	will	is	always	a	rich	sea	of	competing	inclinations	to	begin	with,	Leibniz	can	plausibly	reply	that	purported	cases	of	weakness	of	will	should	always	be	understood	as	cases	where	one	appetite	is	simply	swamped	by	countless	other	appetites.	32	“…regarde	chaque	bien	à	part	en	tant	que	bien…	succès	entier	et	infaillible	n’appartient	qu’à	la	volonté	consequente	…	cette	volonté	consequente,	finale	et	decisive,	resulte	du	conflit	de	toutes	les	volontés	antecedentes	…”	GP	VI	116;	translated	by	E.	Huggard	in:	G.W.	Leibniz,	Theodicy,	LaSalle,	Illinois	1985,	pp.	136-137.				
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choose	a	state	of	affairs	that	is	non-optimal	in	the	sense	that	it	would	not	have	chosen	that	course	of	action	had	it	known	better.				This	last	example	suggests	a	natural	way	of	understanding	Leibniz’s	response	to	a	famous	objection	raised	by	Pierre	Bayle	in	his	Historical	and	
Critical	Dictionary.		Bayle	imagines	a	man	sneaking	up	behind	a	hungry	dog	enjoying	its	dinner,	and	striking	the	dog	with	a	stick	so	that	the	dog	transitions	abruptly	from	feelings	of	pleasure	to	feelings	of	pain.		Bayle	saw	in	this	scenario	a	devastating	critique	of	Leibniz’s	doctrine	of	pre-established	harmony	since	he	could	not	see	how	the	dog’s	“soul	should	be	constructed	in	such	a	way	that	it	would	have	felt	pain	at	the	moment	it	was	hit,”	and,	more	generally,	found	the	“spontaneity	of	this	soul	wholly	incompatible	with	its	feelings	of	pain,	and	in	general	with	all	feelings	it	finds	unpleasant.”33		While	Leibniz	responded	in	detail	to	Bayle’s	concerns,	he	never	seems	to	have	been	much	moved	by	Bayle’s	now	famous	example.		And,	I	think,	reasonably	so.		As	described	by	Bayle,	the	dog	is	at	best	dimly	aware	of	the	threat	coming	from	behind	him,	and	so	could	presumably	perceive,	incorrectly,	but	understandably,	his	continuing	to	eat	his	supper	as	the	subjectively	best	course	of	action	available	to	him.		Thus,	in	replying	to	Bayle,	Leibniz	is	able	to	point	out	that	while	“we	have	no	spontaneous	inclination	towards	what	we	find	unpleasant	…	when	we	know	something	will	displease	us	…	in	this	case	the	dog	[simply]	does	not	know.”34		At	a	first	pass,	Bayle’s	dog	example,	at	least	as	presented	by	Bayle,	turns	out	to	be	not	so	different	from	the	case	of	the	stone-laden	ice	cream	sundae:	although	the	dog	might	have	avoided	the	pain	of	the	blow	had	it	known	better,	there	is	no	reason	to	suppose	that	it	did	know	better,	and	thus	no	reason	to	be	puzzled	by	its	coming	to	experience	pain	in	its	pursuit	of	what	appears	to	it	to	be	most	pleasurable.			In	an	important	recent	development,	however,	Donald	Rutherford	has	suggested	that	this	first-pass	response	fails	to	get	to	the	deep	root	of	the	problem	raised	by	Bayle.		For	our	purposes,	Rutherford’s	worry	might	be	set	out	as	a	dilemma	consisting	of	a	framing	assumption	and	two	principal	horns.35		The	framing	assumption	is	that	Leibniz’s	doctrine	of	monadic	spontaneity	commits	him	to	there	being	a	specific	appetite	sufficient	for	bringing	about	each	specific	state,	including	each	sensation,	that	a	monad	experiences.		But	what	specific	appetite	could	Bayle’s	dog	possibly	have	for	the	sensation	of	pain	it	undergoes?	The	first	horn	argues	that	we	have	no	reason	to	suppose	that	the	dog	might	have	a	subjective	appetite	for	the	sensation	of	pain	per	se	since	it	is	implausible	to	suppose	that	the	dog	might	perceive	or	even	misperceive	the	very	pain	of	the	blow	as	something	desirable.		The	second	horn	argues	that	it	is	likewise	implausible	to	suppose	that	the	dog	might	have	a	subjective	appetite	for	an	
                                                33	“…	que	son	âme	soit	construite	de	telle	sorte,	qu’au	moment	qu’il	est	frappé”	…	“fort	incompatible	la	spontanéité	de	cette	âme	avec	les	sentimens	de	douleur,	et	en	général	avec	toutes	les	perceptions	qui	lui	déplaisent,”	P.	Bayle,	Dictionnaire	
historique	et	critique,	Nouvelle	Édition,		Paris	1820,	p.	610;	Woolhouse	and	Franks,	pp.	73-74.			34	“…	que’on	ne	tend	pas	avec	spontaneité	à	ce	qui	nous	deplaisent	…	quand	nous	savons	que	cela	nous	doit	deplaire	…	Mais	icy	le	chien	ne	le	sait	pas	…”	GP	IV,	532;	Woolhouse	and	Franks,	p.	78	35	“Leibniz	on	Spontaneity,”	pp.	170-174	
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irresolvably	complex	state	of	affairs	that	includes	the	painful	sensation	of	the	blow	of	the	stick	–	that	is	to	say,	the	dog	couldn’t	have	a	subjective	appetite	for	a	state	of	affairs	that	includes	both	pleasure	and	pain	in	an	inextricable	mix.		In	light	of	this	dilemma,	Rutherford	concludes	that	since	the	dog	must	have	some	sufficient	appetite	for	its	painful	sensation	(by	the	framing	assumption),	and	since	that	appetite	cannot	plausibly	be	a	subjective	appetite	(by	the	two	horns),	the	dog	must	have	an	objective	appetite	alone	for	its	state	of	pain,	and	so	it	must	be	the	case	that	in	order	to	follow	the	law	of	objective	teleology	the	dog	must	sometimes	abandon	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.36		Postulating	objective	appetites	that	are	not	at	the	same	time	subjective	appetites	would	admittedly	provide	Leibniz	with	an	especially	straightforward	response	to	Bayle’s	objection.		In	replying	to	Bayle,	Leibniz	could	have	said	that	although	the	dog	does	not	have	a	subjective	appetite	for	the	pain	of	the	blow	of	the	stick,	it	nonetheless	does	have	an	objective	appetite	for	the	pain,	and	that	it	is	that	objective	appetite	for	the	pain	that	explains	the	dog’s	coming	to	have	the	unfortunate	experience	that	it	does.		But	if	Leibniz	meant	to	postulate	objective-but-not-subjective	appetites,	his	actual	response	to	Bayle	is	quite	misleading.		The	fact	that	“we	have	no	spontaneous	inclination	towards	what	we	find	unpleasant	…	when	we	know	something	will	displease	us,”	would	have	pointed	Bayle	in	exactly	the	wrong	direction	since	it	suggests	that	monads	don’t	have	objective	appetites	for	states	that	they	think	will	be	displeasing,	that	is,	that	they	don’t	have	objective	appetites	that	are	not	also	subjective	appetites.	Nor	might	this	be	dismissed	as	just	a	slip.	In	replying	to	inquiries	from	Lady	Masham,	Leibniz	takes	up	the	topic	of	involuntary	and	instinctive	actions.		Here	again	if	he	had	meant	to	countenance	objective-but-not-subjective	appetites,	he	could	have	simply	said	that	in	many	cases	of	involuntary	and	instinctive	actions	monads	are	driven	along	primarily	by	their	objective-but-not-subjective	appetites,	and	in	those	cases	act	not	only	spontaneously	but	also	in	opposition	to	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best	at	the	time	overall.		But	he	doesn’t.		Instead,	once	again	he	appeals	to	confusion,	telling	Masham	that	in	those	cases,	“where	it	seems	only	the	body	plays	a	part,	there	is	in	the	soul	a	desire	for	good	or	an	aversion	to	evil	which	directs	it,	even	though	our	reflection	is	not	able	to	pick	it	out	in	the	confusion,”	a	point	he	underscores	later	in	the	same	paragraph,	again	notably	not	invoking	objective-but-not-subjective	appetites,	in	writing,	“desire	moves	the	soul	from	image	to	image	…	it	is	made	subject	to	the	body	beforehand,	in	so	far	as	it	tends	towards	confused	perceptions”	(G	III,	347;	WF	p.224).		Although	the	postulation	of	objective-but-not-subjective	appetites	would	have	provided	Leibniz	with	an	obvious	reply	to	Bayle’s	objection,	his	actual	response	to	Bayle,	as	well	as	his	response	to	similar	worries	raised	by	Masham,	suggests	that	he	
                                                36	Rutherford	puts	the	point	himself	this	way:		The	lesson	of	Bayle’s	dog,	as	I	read	it,	is	that	if	appetition	is	the	internal	force,	or	endeavor,	that	explains	the	transition	of	the	dog’s	soul	from	a	state	of	pleasure	to	a	state	of	pain,	then	that	endeavor	cannot	operate	in	the	same	way	as	volitional	states	such	as	desire.		Appetition	cannot	be	understood	as	functioning	according	to	the	law	of	desire	teleology	[=subjective	teleology],	for	there	is	no	conceivable	scenario	under	which	the	dog	would	have	represented	its	subsequent	state	of	pain	as	a	good	relative	to	its	present	state	of	pleasure.”	“Leibniz	on	Spontaneity,”	p.	170.	
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didn’t	think	he	needed	them.		Although	this	is	not	the	place	for	a	full	treatment	of	Leibniz’s	textually	and	philosophically	complex	views	on	appetition,	we	might	–	since	the	issue	ultimately	ties	back	into	Leibniz’s	views	on	optimal	form	–	take	up	the	more	limited	task	of	showing	how	Leibniz	might	hope	to	resist	both	horns	as	well	as	the	framing	assumption	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma	without	abandoning	the	thesis	that	monad’s	always	follow	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.					With	respect	to	the	first	horn	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma,	it	should	be	conceded	that	from	a	contemporary	perspective	it	is	indeed	highly	implausible	to	suppose	that	–	pathological	cases	aside	–	we	have	subjective	appetites	for	painful	or	unpleasant	sensations	per	se.37		This	intuition	can	be	seen	as	reflecting	a	general	tendency	to	see	our	sensations	as	falling	on	a	preference	scale	running	from	pleasant	sensations	to	the	absence	of	sensation	to	painful	sensations,	with	our	being	attracted	to	pleasant	sensations,	indifferent	to	the	absence	of	sensation,	and	averse	to	painful	sensations.		Leibniz,	however,	belongs	to	a	long-standing	apologist	tradition	that	generally	sees	things	quite	differently.		Christian	Neo-Platonists	typically	embrace	the	view	that	every	sensation,	insofar	as	it	is	an	existing	thing	or	affection,	is	good	and	desirable.		They	are	thus	inclined	to	insist	that	our	sensations	are	best	ordered	on	a	scale	running	from	pleasant	sensations	to	painful	sensations	to	the	absence	of	sensation,	with	painful	sensations	being	relatively	less	attractive	than	pleasant	ones,	but	still	always	preferable	to	the	absence	of	sensation	altogether.38		Thus	Augustine,	for	example,	notoriously	insists	that	one	would	have	to	prefer,	since	it	is	at	least	some	mode	of	existence,	even	the	eternal	suffering	of	hell	to	the	ultimate	evil	of	non-existence.39		In	light	of	his	sympathy	with	Augustine’s	views	on	the	nature	of	sin	and	evil,	Leibniz	could	maintain	that	finite	agents	have	subjective	appetites	for	all	their	specific	sensations,	even	relatively	unpleasant	ones,	as	well	as	an	aggregated	subjective	appetite	for	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best	overall,	just	as	he	takes	God	to	have	an	antecedent	will	for	every	specific	creatures,	even	relatively	sinful	ones,	and	a	consequent	will	for	the	best	world	as	a	whole.40	In	doing	so,	he	could	reject	the	first	horn	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma	and	maintain	that	Bayle’s	dog	might,	strictly	speaking,	perceive	even	the	very	pain	of	the	blow	of	the	stick	as	something	desirable	per	se	while	still	insisting	that	it	is	nonetheless	much	less	desirable	than	other	sensations	that	the	dog	might	hope	to	experience.	Leibniz	could	also	reject	the	second	horn	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma.		In	general,	Leibniz	seems	to	hold	that	that	our	everyday	sensations	are	typically	complex	states	of	affairs,	mixtures	of	what	we	find	both	pleasant	and	unpleasant.		He	also	seems	to	think	that	those	complex	states	are	generally	analyzable	into	constituent	sensations	–	that	on	closer	inspection	our	everyday	sensations	reveal	
                                                37	See,	Rutherford,	“Leibniz	on	Spontaneity,”	pp.	171;	179,	fn	30	38	Some	evidence	that	this	approach	is	not	entirely	foreign	to	contemporary	ways	of	thinking	is	provided	by	anecdotal	reports	of	depressives,	who	are	reported	to	sometimes	forego	their	medications	on	the	grounds	that	they	would	rather	feel	miserable	than	numb,	rather	suffer	than	feel	nothing	at	all.	39	St.	Augustine,	De	Libero	Arbitrio,	in	Corpus	Christianorum:	Series	Latina,	volume	29,	W.	M.	Green	(ed.),	Brepols,	1970,	p.	286f.		Available	in	English	translation	in	Thomas	Williams	(ed.	and	trans.),	On	Free	Choice	of	Will,	Indianapolis,	Indiana	1993,	p.	83f.			40	GP	VI,	127	
 16 
themselves	to	be	confusions	of	lesser	sensations.		It	is,	of	course,	tempting	to	suppose,	as	Rutherford’s	second	horn	suggests,	that	such	an	analysis	must	in	principle	come	to	an	end	somewhere,	terminating	in	a	final	level	of	analysis	in	which	our	sensations	would	be	fully	sorted	out	into	pure	pleasures	and	unadulterated	pains.	Leibniz’s	analysis	of	structurally	analogous	phenomena,	however,	generally	supports	a	rather	different	picture,	one	according	to	which	at	every	level	of	analysis	we	find	not	only	greater	resolution,	but	also	further	complexity.		Thus,	for	example,	Leibniz	suggests	that	a	full	analysis	of	the	organic	world	would	show	that	larger	creatures	contain	smaller	creatures	that	contain	smaller	creatures	all	the	way	down	so	that	there	is	no	final	level	of	analysis	at	which	there	are	creatures	that	cannot	themselves	be	resolved	further	into	still	smaller	creatures.41		Nothing	prevents	Leibniz	from	saying	something	quite	similar	about	our	appetites.		Our	manifest,	everyday	experiences	might	be	thought	of	as	being	constituted	by	mixtures	of	pleasurable	and	painful	sensations;	those	constituting	sensations	might	in	turn	be	thought	of	as	being	constituted	as	well	by	mixtures	of	pleasurable	and	unpleasurable	sensations,	and	so	on	all	the	way	down.		In	that	case,	Leibniz	could	maintain	that	even	our	everyday	sensations	may	involve	an	inextricable	mix	of	pleasurable	and	unpleasurable	sensations	in	the	sense	that	there	is	simply	no	level	of	analysis	at	which	particular	sensations	must	be	resolved	into	pure	pleasures	and	pure	pains.		Leibniz,	it	would	seem,	could	thus	not	only	reject	the	first	horn	of	Rutherford’s	dilemma	but	the	second	horn	as	well.	Finally,	and	most	significantly,	I	think	Leibniz	in	fact	implicitly	rejects	the	assumption	that	frames	Rutherford’s	dilemma.		The	intuition	that	there	must	be	a	specific	“local”	appetite	sufficient	for	bringing	about	each	specific	“local”	perception,	including	each	of	a	monad’s	sensations,	might	be	encouraged	by	the	assumption	that	Leibniz	means	to	offer	an	essentially	atomistic	or	reductionist	explanation	of	monadic	agency.		On	such	a	view,	it	might	be	thought	that	if	a	monad	produces	two	(possibly	complex,	but	not	global)	states	S1	and	S2,	then	there	must	be	two	distinct	(possibly	complex,	but	not	global)	appetitive	states	A1	and	A2	such	that	A1	exhaustively	explains	the	occurrence	of	S1	and	A2	exhaustively	explains	the	occurrence	of	S2.		So,	for	example,	it	might	be	thought	that	if	a	monad	comes	to	have	a	perception	an	ice	cream	cone	and	a	perception	of	a	cup	of	coffee,	it	must	have	had	an	appetite	for	an	ice	cream	cone	that	by	itself	explains	the	monad’s	coming	to	have	to	have	a	perception	of	an	ice	cream	cone	and	an	appetite	for	a	cup	of	coffee	that	by	itself	explains	the	monad’s	coming	to	have	a	perception	of	a	cup	of	coffee.	If	that	were	the	case,	Leibniz	would	indeed	be	committed	to	holding	that	there	must	be	a	specific	“local”	appetite	sufficient	for	bringing	about	each	specific	“local”	perception,	and	we	might	well	suppose	that	where	S1	is	a	painful	sensation	that	he	will	be	hard	pressed	to	maintain	that	its	corresponding	appetite	A1	is	a	subjective	appetite	(even	in	spite	of	the	subtleties	of	the	last	two	paragraphs).			Leibniz’s	explanations	in	terms	of	optimality,	however,	militate	against	any	such	atomistic	or	reductionist	explanatory	approach.		Indeed,	their	power	lies	precisely	in	their	ability	to	draw	together	into	a	single	explanation	both	local	and	global,	atomistic	and	holistic	considerations.		Leibniz’s	treatment	of	the	catenary,	for	example,	shows	how	the	states	of	each	link	of	a	hanging	chain	may	
                                                41	GP	III,	356;	GP	VI,	539-46;	A	VI.iv.1399	
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be	explained	by	taking	into	consideration	not	only	the	contributions	of	each	link	but	also	the	constraints	of	the	chain	as	a	whole.		An	atomistic	focus	on	any	one	individual	link	would	leave	unexplained,	for	example,	why	that	link	does	not	assume	a	lower	energy	state.	Leibniz’s	treatment	of	divine	agency	similarly	suggests	that	God’s	decision	to	create,	say,	Judas	can	only	be	explained	by	taking	into	consideration	not	only	the	worth	of	Judas	but	also	the	worth	of	every	other	possible	substance	and	the	constraints	governing	creation.		An	atomistic	focus	on	Judas	alone	would	leave	unexplained,	for	example,	why	God	does	not	create	a	less	egregious	sinner	(whether	that	less	egregious	sinner	is	a	modified	Judas	or	a	Judas	counterpart).		The	same	lesson,	I	think,	applies	in	the	case	of	monadic	agency.		A	monad’s	coming	to	have	any	particular	“local”	state	S1	can	only	be	fully	explained	by	taking	into	consideration	not	only	some	particular	“local”	appetite	A1	but	also	all	its	other	specific	local	appetites	as	well	as	the	constraints	imposed	by	its	point	of	view.42		A	narrow	focus	on,	say,	a	monad’s	appetite	for	two	scoops	of	chocolate	ice	cream	would	leave	unexplained	why	it	in	fact	comes	to	have	an	experience	of	one	scoop	of	ice	cream,	a	cup	of	coffee	and	some	leftover	change.		Reflection	on	how	Leibniz’s	optimality	explanations	work	thus	suggests	that	he	implicitly	rejects	Rutherford’s	framing	assumption,	that	is,	that	he	would	deny	that	specific	“local”	states	of	a	monad	can	always	be	explained	atomistically	by	appeal	to	specific	“local”	appetites.	It’s	worth	noting	that	Leibniz’s	explanatory	approach	to	monadic	agency	has	perhaps	unexpected	implications	for	how	we	should	understand	the	efficient	causal	structure	of	monads.		An	atomistic	explanatory	approach	encourages	the	view	that	the	true	causal	relata	of	monadic	agency	must	be	specific	“local”	states,	particular	appetites	and	particular	perceptions.	A	monad’s	transitioning	from	one	global	state	to	another	global	state	would	on	this	picture	be	a	derivative	consequence	of	its	local	appetites	bringing	about	local	perceptions.		A	monad	would	come	to	have	a	global	state	in	virtue	of	its	coming	to	have	all	the	local	states	that	constitute	that	global	state.		While	Leibniz’s	willingness	to	talk	of	particular	perceptions	and	particular	appetites	might	invite	such	a	picture,	a	reductionist	model	of	monadic	causation	turns	out	to	be	difficult	to	square	with	his	more	holistic	explanatory	approach	to	monadic	agency.	For	if	the	true	causal	relata	of	monadic	agency	are	local	appetites	and	local	perceptions,	we	should	want	an	account	of	how	exactly	we	are	to	understand	the	causal	influences	that	would	have	to	hold	between	rival	appetites	and	their	corresponding	perceptions.		If,	for	example,	A1	not	only	helps	to	explain	a	monad’s	coming	to	have	a	state	S1	but	also	a	state	S2,	how	are	we	supposed	to	understand	the	causal	influence	of	A1	
                                                42	The	point	of	view	constraint	itself	is,	I	think,	best	thought	of	as	a	contingent	constraint	ultimately	grounded	in	God’s	decision	to	create	the	best	of	all	possible	worlds.		For	Leibniz,	it	is	logically	possible	for	a	monad	to,	say,	represent	itself	as	discontinuously	jumping	from	one	location	to	another.		Such	a	possibility,	however,	is	ruled	out	by	God’s	decision	to	create	the	best	of	all	possible	worlds	in	which	laws	of	continuity	and	harmony	obtain.		The	status	of	the	point	of	view	constraint	is	thus	strictly	analogous	to	the	status	of	other	laws	of	nature.		So,	for	example,	for	Leibniz,	it	is	similarly	possible	that,	say,	the	movement	of	one	link	of	a	chain	not	be	constrained	in	the	least	by	other	links	to	which	it	is	joined.		Such	a	possibility,	however,	is	ruled	out	by	God’s	decision	to	create	the	best	of	all	possible	world	in	which	the	laws	of	physics	as	we	know	them	obtain.	
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on	S2?		It	is	not	easy	to	see	how	A1	could	be	a	direct	cause	of	S2	since	it	is	by	stipulation	a	local	appetite	for	S1	and	not	S2,	and	it	is	unclear	what	sort	of	causal	bond	there	could	be	between	S1	and	S2	such	that	A1’s	causally	influencing	S1	might,	via	that	bond,	causally	influence	S2.		Leibniz’s	non-atomistic	explanatory	approach	to	monadic	agency	thus	suggests	a	rather	different	picture	of	the	causal	structure	of	monads,	one	according	to	which	the	true	causal	relata	involved	in	monadic	agency	are	not	“local”	or	partial	representational	and	appetitive	states	but	rather	global	or	holistic	representational	and	appetitive	states.	On	such	a	picture,	each	monad	would,	as	it	were,	start	with	a	global	representation	of	its	entire	world,	and	then	transition	to	its	next	global	representation	under	the	causal	influence	of	a	global	appetitive	state.		Particular	appetites,	such	a	A1	and	A2	would	then	be	understood	as	decompositions	of	the	monad’s	global	appetites	in	much	the	same	way	that	Leibniz	often	treats,	say,	the	orthogonal	motions	of	diagonally	moving	bodies	as	decompositions	of	their	true	motions.	Just	as	the	conceptual	decomposition	of	a	motion	into	orthogonal	vectors	may	prove	useful	for	understanding	a	body’s	response	to	a	collision,	so	the	conceptual	decomposition	of	global	appetites	into	local	appetites	may	be	useful	for	understanding	the	agency	of	a	monad.	But	it	would	be	a	mistake	in	both	cases,	I	think,	to	take	such	decompositions	too	literally,	to	infer	from	Leibniz’s	explanatorily	useful	distinctions	that	the	real	tendencies	of	the	diagonally	moving	body	are	its	orthogonal	tendencies	and	that	the	true	causal	relata	of	an	unfolding	monad	are	its	local	appetites	and	perceptions.		In	the	case	of	monads,	doing	so	not	only	threatens	to	obscure	the	sophisticated	nature	of	Leibniz’s	explanatory	approach	to	monadic	agency,	but	also	encourages	a	misleading	picture	of	the	causal	structure	of	monads	themselves.43		 Optimal	Form	and	a	Role	for	Reason	
	 Leibniz’s	understanding	of	monadic	teleology	provides	him	with	a	framework	for	explaining,	at	least	in	principle,	how	complex	and	sophisticated	developments	or	behaviors	might	be	constructed	from	relatively	simple	inclinations.		A	creature	with	nothing	more	than	petite	appetitions	for	light	might	enjoy	only	very	simple	developments	–	appetites	giving	rise	to,	say,	the	behavior	of	tacking	towards	sunshine	and	away	from	darkness.		A	creature	with	a	handful	of	different	kinds	of	inclinations,	however,	might	enjoy	exponentially	more	complicated	states,	states	corresponding	to,	say,	the	behavior	of	an	animal	that	seeks	sunshine,	unless	it	is	a	little	too	thirsty	or	very	hot.	Indeed,	given	infinitely	many	appetites,	and	an	omniscient	God	to	combine	them,	there	would	seem	to	be	almost	no	limit	to	the	behavioral	sophistication	of	a	Leibnizian	agent.		Working	with	infinitely	many	inclinations,	Leibniz’s	God,	it	would	seem,	could	create	
                                                43	The	same	lesson,	I	think,	applies	in	the	case	of	divine	agency.		It	should	not	be	supposed	that	God’s	consequent	will	is	literally	a	derivative	consequence	of	his	cumulative	antecedent	wills.		The	thought	that	God	could	have	genuinely	efficacious,	yet	inconsistent	wills,	most	of	which	are	ultimately	frustrated	is	at	best	semi-coherent.		Better	to	suppose	that	God’s	antecedent	wills	are	merely	explanatorily	useful	decompositions	of	his	consequent	will;	they	are	not	causally	efficacious	per	se,	but	rather	afford	us	a	way	of	understanding	God’s	consequent	will,	which	is	efficacious	per	se.	
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creatures	that	could	be	appropriately	described	as	finding	and	burying	acorns	for	the	winter,	damming	rivers	to	improve	their	environment,	and	even	returning	library	books	in	order	to	avoid	late	fees.44		In	spite	of	the	already	rich	resources	of	his	theory,	however,	Leibniz	nonetheless	clearly	wishes	to	carve	out	a	special	role	for	reason	in	the	teleological	unfolding	of	monads.		But	what	role	exactly?		An	important	clue	to	Leibniz’s	thinking	on	this	point	is	provided	by	a	well	known,	but	I	think	not	fully	understood,	passage	from	the	New	Essays.		It	begins	with	Leibniz	suggesting	that	appetites	are	“the	first	steps	that	nature	makes	us	take;	not	so	much	towards	happiness	as	towards	joy,	since	in	them	one	looks	only	to	the	present”	and	his	noting	that	“experience	and	reason”	can	nonetheless	“teach	us	to	govern	and	moderate	them	so	that	they	can	lead	us	to	happiness.”45	The	passage	continues	with	the	following	striking	analogy:		“Appetitions	are	like	a	stone’s	endeavor	to	follow	the	shortest	but	not	always	the	best	route	to	the	center	of	the	earth;	it	cannot	foresee	that	it	will	collide	with	rocks	on	which	it	will	shatter,	whereas	it	would	have	got	closer	to	its	goal	if	it	had	had	the	wit	and	the	means	to	swerve	aside.		In	the	same	way,	by	rushing	straight	at	a	present	pleasure	we	sometimes	fall	into	the	abyss	of	misery.		That	is	why	reason	opposes	appetition	with	images	of	greater	goods	or	evils	to	come,	and	with	a	firm	policy	and	practice	of	thinking	before	acting	and	then	standing	by	whatever	is	found	to	be	the	best	…”46	The	surface	implication	of	the	analogy	is,	I	think,	clear	enough:	non-rational	creatures,	and	indeed	rational	creatures	insofar	as	they	don’t	use	their	reason	(that	is,	most	of	us,	most	of	the	time)47	are	destined	to	be	driven	by	their	short-range	desires,	often	suffering	greater	miseries	as	a	result.		The	mouse	grabs	the	cheese	and	is	caught	in	a	trap;	I	impetuously	eat	too	much	dessert	and	regret	doing	so	later.48		There	is,	however,	also	a	deeper,	more	easily	overlooked	
                                                44	cf.	P.	Bayle,	“Dictionnaire	historique	et	critique	,”	pp.	617-618;	GP	IV,	555-559.	45	On	the	relationship	between	joy	and	happiness	in	Leibniz	see	his	letter	to	C.	Wolff	18	May	1715	in	Briefwechsel	zwischen	Leibniz	und	Christian	Wolff,	C.	I.	Gerhardt	(ed.),	Halle,	1860;	reprinted,	Hildesheim	1963,	pp.	171-172;	Ariew	and	Garber,	pp.	232-234.	46	Les	appetitions	sont	comme	la	tendence	de	la	Pierre	qui	va	les	plus	droit	mais	non	pas	tousjours	le	meilleur	chemin	vers	le	centre	de	la	terre,	ne	pouvant	pas	prevoir	qu’elle	rencontrera	des	rochers	où	elle	se	brisera;	au	lieu	qu’elle	se	seroit	approchée	d’avantage	de	son	but,	si	elle	avoit	eu	l’esprit	et	le	moyen	de	se	detourner.		C’est	ainsi	qu’allant	droit	vers	le	present	plaisir	nous	tombons	quelques	fois	dans	le	precipice	de	la	misere.		C’est	pourquoy	la	raison	y	oppose	les	images	des	plus	grands	biens	ou	maux	à	venir	et	une	ferme	resolution	et	habitude	de	penser	avant	que	de	faire,	et	puis	de	suivre	ce	qui	aura	esté	reconnu	le	meilleur	…”	A.VI.189;	Remnant	and	Bennett,	p.	189;	see	also	A.VI.vi.194).	47	Principes	de	la	Nature	et	de	la	Grace	§5;	GP	VI,	600;	see	also	A	VI.vi.	50-51,	475.		48	In	an	amusing	aside,	Leibniz	notes;	J’ay	connu	un	homme	considerable	dans	l’Eglise	et	dans	l’estat	que	ses	infirmités	avoient	fait	se	resoudre	à	la	diete,	mais	il	avoua	qu’il	n’avoit	pû	resister	à	l’odeur	des	viandes	qu’on	portoit	aux	autres	en	passant	devant	
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implication	that	is	intimately	related	to	Leibniz’s	thinking	about	optimal	form,	and	in	particular	to	a	technical	wrinkle	passed	over	in	the	discussion	above.			Earlier	it	was	noted	that	every	segment	of	a	catenary	must	itself	be	a	catenary	–	a	result	that,	as	we	have	seen,	Leibniz	exploits	quite	effectively	in	relating	the	optimization	of	the	world	to	the	optimization	of	monads,	and	the	optimization	of	monads	to	the	optimization	of	appetites.		Significantly,	however,	the	inverse	of	that	relation	does	not	hold:	even	if	every	segment	of	a	suspended	cord	is	a	catenary,	it	does	not	follow	that	the	cord	itself	must	be	a	catenary,	as	the	following	diagram	illustrates	in	an	intuitive	way:		
	 	 												Figure	5		In	the	diagram,	the	segments	AB,	BC,	and	CD	are	themselves	catenaries,	but	the	chain	AD	is	nonetheless	not	a	catenary.		In	such	a	case,	we	might	say	that	the	chain	is	“locally”	a	catenary,	and	yet	not	“globally”	a	catenary.	This	asymmetry	–	that	global	optimization	implies	local	optimization,	but	that	local	optimization	does	not	imply	global	optimization	–	arises	in	other	applications	of	optimal	form	as	well.	Thus,	to	take	an	example	that	Leibniz	himself	considers,	a	ray	of	light	reflecting	off	of	a	concave	mirror	may	take	a	path	that	is	everywhere	locally	optimal,	and	yet	still	not	globally	optimal	as	the	following	diagram	helps	to	illustrate.49	
	 	 	 	 					Figure	6		Intuitively,	the	actual	path	of	the	ray	of	light	–	indicated	in	Figure	6	by	the	solid	line	–	is	locally	optimal	in	the	sense	that	the	overall	path	could	not	be	improved	by	replacing	any	sufficiently	small	piece	with	a	“better”	small	piece.		Nonetheless,	the	path	is	not	globally	optimal	in	the	sense	that	there	is	another	path	from	the	light	source	to	the	observer	–	indicated	by	the	dashed	line	–	that	would	be	better	overall.		In	slightly	different	terms,	the	path	of	the	ray	of	light	in	the	case	depicted	in	the	diagram	is	locally	optimal	in	the	sense	that	it	follows	a	path	that	
                                                                                                                                       son	appartement.	C’est	sans	doute	une	honteuse	foiblesse,	mais	voilà	comme	les	hommes	sont	faits.		A	VI.vi.187		49	GP	VII,	275-277;	see	also	Unicum	Opticae,	Catoptricae	&	Dioptricae	Principium,	Dutens	pp.	145-150.			
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is	shorter	than	any	possible	nearby	path,	but	globally	non-optimal	in	the	sense	that	there	is	at	least	one	(non-nearby)	path	that	is	shorter	overall.50	With	this	local/global	asymmetry	in	mind,	we	can	see	more	clearly	that	Leibniz’s	falling	stone	analogy	suggests	a	surprisingly	precise	demarcation	between	the	capacities	afforded	to	non-rational	and	rational	creatures.		Non-rational	creatures	are,	for	Leibniz,	destined	to	always	follow	courses	of	action	that	are	locally,	but	not	necessarily	globally,	optimal.	They	are	somewhat	like	a	dog	lost	in	a	wood	that	follows	the	strategy	of	taking	whatever	path	is	immediately	less	strenuous.		If	all	goes	well,	the	dog	may	in	fact	follow	a	path	that	is	indeed	the	best	path	overall	–	perhaps	it	starts	at	one	end	of	a	long	valley	and	runs	to	the	other	end.		But	it	may	just	as	well	find	itself	following	a	path	that	is,	on	the	whole,	much	more	arduous	than	if	it	had	selected	a	few	uphill	paths	along	the	way.		By	rushing	at	present	pleasure,	it	may,	to	borrow	Leibniz’s	words,	fall	into	an	“abyss	of	misery.”		To	rational	creatures,	however,	Leibniz	attributes	additional	capacities	enabling	them,	in	principle,	to	avoid	merely	locally	optimal	courses	of	action	in	favor	of	globally	optimal	courses	of	action.		Reason	allows	us,	according	to	Leibniz,	to	be	more	like	hikers	with	maps,	who	may	reliably	chart	courses	that	are	easiest	overall,	not	simply	easiest	at	each	juncture.		They	have,	in	Leibniz’s	words,	the	“the	wit	and	means	to	swerve	aside,”	to	avoid	pitfalls	and	dead	ends,	and	thereby	to	come	closer	to	achieving	their	overarching	goals.		If	the	teleological	agency	of	finite	creatures	maps	neatly	onto	Leibniz’s	understanding	of	optimal	forms,	his	distinction	between	non-rational	and	rational	creatures	corresponds	equally	well	to	the	asymmetry	of	the	relationship	between	local	and	global	optimization.			Leibniz’s	falling	stone	analogy,	and	the	asymmetry	it	suggests,	however,	might	invite	anew	the	suspicion	that	at	least	some	monads	are	not	always	subject	to	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.		For	one	way	in	which	reason	might	provide	rational	creatures	with	the	ability	to	follow	globally	optimal	courses	of	action	is	by	providing	them	with	the	ability	to	act	contrary	to	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.		On	such	a	picture,	reason	would	be	like	a	miraculous	power	allowing	creatures	like	us	to	will	a	state	of	affairs	other	than	that	which,	in	our	present	state,	appears	to	us	to	be	best	overall.		And,	indeed,	one	might	see	Leibniz	himself	as	advocating	for	such	a	view	in	suggesting	that	reason’s	role	is	“all	a	matter	of	‘Think	carefully’	and	‘Remember’	–	by	the	first	to	make	laws,	and	by	the	second	to	follow	them	even	when	we	do	not	remember	the	reasons	from	which	they	sprang.”51		For	one	might	understandably	see	in	this	remark	the	suggestion	that	reason	might	allow	us,	as	rational	creatures,	to	formulate	rules	that	we	might	then	steadfastly	abide	by	even	when	those	rules	seem	to	run	contrary	to	our	overall	inclinations.		On	this	picture,	I	might,	for	example,	use	reason	to	formulate	a	rule	to	never	lie	to	anyone	at	anytime,	and	then	abide	by	
                                                50	For	a	technical,	but	relatively	accessible,	treatment	of	the	sense	in	which	optimal	forms	are	typically	“stationary”	forms	–	i.e.	forms	that	assume	(merely)	
locally	maximum	or	minimum	values,	see	D.	Lemons,	Perfect	Form:		Variational	
Principles,	Methods,	and	Applications	in	Elementary	Physics,	Princeton	1997,	pp.	8-9,	71.		51	“…	que	tout	consiste	dans	le	pensés	y	bien	et	dans	le	memento;	le	premier	pour	se	faire	des	loix,	et	le	second	pour	les	suivre,	lors	même	qu’on	ne	pense	pas	à	la	raison	qui	les	a	fait	naistre”	A.VI.vi,	189-190;	Remnant	and	Bennett,	pp.189-190.	
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that	rule	even	in	circumstances	where	lying	seems	to	me	to	be	the	best	thing	to	do	all	things	considered	and	at	a	point	at	which	I	cannot,	for	the	life	of	me,	see	any	good	even	in	the	rule	itself.			Although	initially	tempting,	such	a	contra-appetitive	picture	of	the	role	of	reason	should,	I	think,	be	resisted	as	a	reading	of	Leibniz’s	considered	position.		For	while	one	can	read	such	a	model	back	into	some	of	Leibniz’s	statements,	it	simply	does	not	square	with	the	numerous	passages	in	which	Leibniz	suggests	that	all	creatures	–	not	just	non-rational	ones	–	act	under	the	guise	of	the	good.52		Nor	does	it	fit	well	with	Leibniz’s	account	of	the	relationship	between	divine	reason	and	volition,	where	reason	and	volition	are	always	presented	as	concurring	aspects	of	divine	perfection.53		Most	importantly,	however,	the	supposition	that	creatures	might	abide	by	the	dictates	of	reason	in	opposition	to	the	sum	of	their	overall	inclinations	threatens	to	undermine	the	entire	framework	of	Leibniz’s	account	of	monadic	agency.		For	how	are	we	to	understand	the	proposed	ability	of	an	agent	to	abide	by	a	rule	of	reason	in	opposition	to	the	overall	sum	of	her	inclinations?		Leibniz’s	dogged	opposition	to	libertarian	and	voluntaristic	conceptions	of	the	will,	as	well	as	his	more	foundational	commitment	to	the	principle	of	sufficient	reason,	indicate	that	for	him	the	will	must	have	some	reason	for	abiding	by	any	resolution.		If	an	agent	does	not	see	abiding	by	a	particular	rule	–	even	a	rule	she	arrived	at	earlier	–	as	in	keeping	with	the	overall	best	course	of	action	to	follow,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	she	could	follow	it	at	all	given	Leibniz’s	framework;	and,	if	she	does	see	following	the	rule	as	according	with	her	overall	inclinations,	then	her	acting	in	accordance	with	that	rule	needn’t	constitute	a	violation	of	the	law	of	subjective	teleology	after	all.			But	if	reason	does	not	act	as	a	contra-appetitive	power,	how	does	it	assist	rational	creatures	in	pursuing	not	only	locally,	but	globally	optimal	courses	of	action?		A	closer	look	at	Leibniz’s	texts	suggests	three	distinguishable	strategies	consistent	with	his	commitment	to	the	(non-miraculous)	inviolability	of	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.			 First,	reason	might	assist	rational	creatures	in	their	pursuit	of	long-range	goods	by	reducing	the	discrepancy	between	what	they	perceive	to	be,	and	what	actually	are,	the	best	courses	of	action	available	to	them.	Leibniz	is	firm	in	his	conviction	that	virtuous	action	is	always	accompanied	by	greater	pleasure	in	the	long	run,	and	conversely	that	vicious	action	always	brings	with	it	diminished	pleasure	and	greater	pain	either	immediately	or	subsequently	as	the	result	of	divine	punishment.54	The	sinner,	for	Leibniz,	thus	turns	out	to	be	not	so	different	from	Bayle’s	dog.		In	pursuing	salient	pleasures,	he	runs	headlong	into	greater,	if	less	obvious,	miseries.		Through	the	use	of	reason,	however,	rational	creatures	might	come	to	see	more	clearly	the	evil	contained	in	merely	apparent	goods	as	well	as	“the	good	which	exists	on	the	opposite	side.”55		They	may	thus,	in	short,	
                                                52	A.VI.vi,	180;	A.VI.vi,	182;	A.VI.vi,	185-188;	GP	III,	341;	GP	III,	347;	G	III,	349;	GP	III,	469;	GP	VI,	588;	GP	IV,	438.	53	See,	for	example,	GP	VI,	106-108;	GP	IV,	438.	54	Monadologie	§	90;	GP	VI,	622-623;	Principes	de	la	Nature	et	de	la	Grace	§15;	GP	VI,	605		55	“…le	bien	qui	est	dans	le	parti	contraire…”	A.VI.vi.186;	NE	186;	Remnant	and	Bennett,	p.	186.	
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come	to	better	see	the	true	costs	of	sinful	behavior	as	well	as	the	full	rewards	of	virtuous	actions,	and	in	doing	so	pursue	courses	of	action	that	are	pleasurable	not	merely	in	the	short	term,	but	in	the	long	run	as	well.			Second,	reason	might	come	to	the	aid	of	rational	creatures	by	contriving	circumstances	or	habits	for	avoiding	ultimately	harmful	appetitions	as	well	as	for	cultivating	ultimately	helpful	ones.		Leibniz	notes	that	a	lover,	in	a	virtuous	frame	of	mind,	might	undertake	a	journey	to	guard	himself	against	the	later	call	of	“confused	but	potent	pleasures.”		He	cites	with	approval	the	case	of	“Francisco	Borgia,	the	General	of	the	Jesuits”	who	cured	himself	of	his	habit	of	drinking	heavily	“by	each	day	letting	a	drop	of	wax	fall	into	the	flagon	which	he	was	accustomed	to	drinking	dry.”		And	he	suggests	that	we	may	hope	to	avoid	the	vices	of	“dangerous	interests”	and	“idleness”	by	opposing	them	with	innocent	virtues	such	as	“farming	or	gardening,”	carrying	out	experiments,	or	engaging	in	“useful	and	agreeable	conversation	or	reading.”56		By	promoting	appropriate	circumstances	and	habits,	reason	fulfills	it	function	not	so	much	by	helping	us	to	see	the	good	and	bad	often	hidden	in	virtuous	and	vicious	actions,	but	by	contriving	ways	of	preserving	our	appreciation	of	the	good,	and	avoiding	situations	in	which	our	confused	perceptions	and	appetites	are	likely	to	overwhelm	our	better	natures.				 Third,	reason	may	help	us	to	pursue	globally	optimal	courses	of	action	by	making	available	to	us	higher	pleasures	that	would	otherwise	be	inaccessible	to	us.		In	an	important	passage	from	the	New	Essays,	prefaced	by	a	reference	to	the	stone	analogy	discussed	above,	Leibniz	relates	that	there	are	certain	“distinct	inclinations	which	reason	gives	us	…	which	occur	in	the	knowledge	and	production	of	order	and	harmony,	[and]	are	the	most	valuable.”57		Likewise	in	letter	to	Christian	Wolff,	dated	18	May	1715,	Leibniz	implies	that	while	animals	are	capable	of	certain	sorts	of	pleasures,	we,	in	virtue	of	being	rational	creatures,	are	capable	of	enjoying	non-empirical,	a	priori	pleasures.58		Finally,	in	the	
Principles	of	Nature	and	Grace,	Leibniz	suggests	that	it	is	only	through	reason	that	we	can	come	to	love	God	in	a	disinterested	way	that	not	only	“constitutes	our	greatest	good	and	our	greatest	interest”	but	that	also	“assures	us	future	happiness”	since	such	a	love	of	God	necessarily	“fulfills	our	hopes,	and	leads	us	down	the	road	of	supreme	happiness.”59		In	this	respect,	reason	comes	to	our	aid,	
                                                56	“plaisirs	…	qui	sont	confus	mais	touchans	…	François	de	Borgia	General	des	Jesuites	…	en	faisant	tomber	chaque	jour	une	goutte	de	cire	dans	le	bocal	qu’il	avoit	accoustumé	de	vuider	…	A	des	sensibilités	dangereuses	on	opposera	quelqu’autre	sensibilité	innocente,	comme	l’agriculture,	le	jardinage;	on	fuira	l’oisiveté	…	ou	dans	quelque	conversation	ou	lecture	utile	et	agreable.”	A.vi.vi.187;	Remnant	and	Bennett,	187;	see	also	A.VI.vi,182,	196;	Remnant	and	Bennett,	182.	57	“…et	enfin	il	y	a	des	inclinations	distinctes	que	la	raison	nous	donne	…	qui	se	trouvent	dans	la	connoissance	et	production	de	l’ordre	et	harmonie	sont	les	plus	estimables”	A.VI.vi.194-195;	Remnant	and	Bennett	194-195.	58	G.W.	Leibniz	to	C.	Wolff	18	May	1715	in	Briefwechsel	zwischen	Leibniz	und	
Christian	Wolff,	C.	I.	Gerhardt	(ed.),	Halle,	1860;	reprinted,	Hildesheim	1963,	p.	171;	Ariew	and	Garber,	p.	233.	59	“	…	il	fait	par	luy	même	notre	plus	grand	bien	et	interest	…	qui	nous	assure	même	un		bonheur	futur	…	car	l’amour	de	Dieu	remplit	encore	nos	esperances,	et	
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according	to	Leibniz,	not	simply	by	maximizing	the	promise	of	pleasure	already	implicit	in	our	mundane	appetites	and	perceptions,	but	by	also	providing	us	with	access	to	a	higher,	more	potent	source	of	enduring	happiness.			Significantly,	none	of	the	three	strategies	just	sketched	require	rational	creatures	to	abandon	locally	optimal	courses	of	action	in	order	to	pursue	globally	optimal	courses	of	action	–	to	act	contrary	to	the	sum	of	their	present	inclinations	in	order	to	gain	a	greater	unforeseen	outcome.		In	helping	us	to	see	the	true	benefits	and	costs	of	our	actions,	reason	may	directly	affect	which	options	seem	most	attractive	to	us	–	knowing	that	there	is	a	stone	in	my	sundae	makes	it	much	less	desirable	to	me	–	but	it	does	not	require	me	to	choose	an	overall	state	of	affairs	other	than	what	I	perceive	to	be	the	best	at	the	time	of	acting.		Likewise,	in	helping	us	to	cultivate	circumstances	and	habits	conducive	to	long	term	happiness,	reason	may	influence	what	desires	we	are	likely	to	have	in	the	future	–	my	habit	of	gardening	is	likely	to	lead	me	to	desire	to	be	outside,	to	till	the	soil,	etc.,	whereas	my	habit	of	gambling	is	likely	instead	to	lead	me	to	desire	to	be	at	the	casino,	to	covet	money,	etc.			As	before,	reason	may	thus	influence	–	indirectly	in	this	case	–	what	I	perceive	to	be	the	best	state	of	affairs	overall;	in	exercising	its	influence,	however,	it	does	not	require	me	to	act	contrary	to	what	I	perceive	to	be	the	best	at	the	time	of	acting.		Finally,	in	making	available	higher	pleasures	–	including	those	of	the	a	priori	sciences,	and	the	intellectual	love	of	God	–	reason	makes	it	possible	for	rational	creatures	to	enjoy	appetites	unavailable	to	non-rational	creatures.		Rational	reflection	might	lead	me	to	a	greater	appreciation	of	eternal	truths	and	divine	love,	and	in	doing	so	prompt	me	to	further	study	and	pious	reflection.		As	before,	however,	reason’s	fulfilling	its	role	in	this	way	does	not	require	rational	creatures	to	run	contrary	to	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best.		A	brief	survey	of	the	various	ways	in	which	reason	may	assist	finite,	rational	agents	in	pursuing	long-range	goods	can	thus	be	seen	to	lend	support	to	the	suggestion	that	Leibniz’s	considered	view	is	that	no	agent	–	rational	or	non-rational	–	ever	acts	contrary	to	the	law	of	subjective	teleology.				
Conclusion		 There	has	been	much	debate	recently	over	whether	Leibniz	was	or	was	not	a	systematic	philosopher.		A	once	standard	view	presents	Leibniz	as	a	universal	genius,	eager	to	draw	connections	between	various	fields	and	striving	in	general	for	systematic	coherence,	even	if	not	always	quite	achieving	it.		Such	a	view	was	endorsed	early	in	the	last	century	in	an	especially	strong	form	by	Bertrand	Russell,	who	suggested	that	Leibniz’s	thought	might	even	suitably	be	arranged	as	series	of	deductive	inferences	in	the	more	geometrico	of	Spinoza’s	
Ethics.60		While	few	commentators	today	would	go	as	far	as	Russell,	more	modest	views	of	Leibniz	as	a	systematic	philosopher	have	remained	popular.		Offering	an	analogy	that,	I	think,	captures	nicely	the	spirit	in	which	many	recent	
                                                                                                                                       nous	mene	dans	le	chemin	du	supreme	bonheur	…”	(Principes	de	la	Nature	et	de	
la	Grace	§18;	GP	VI,	606).			60	B.	Russell,	A	Critical	Exposition	of	the	Philosophy	of	Leibniz,	2nd	edition,	London	1937,	p.	1.	
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commentators	have	read	Leibniz,	Michel	Serres	has	suggested	that	Leibniz’s	thinking	might	be	likened	to	a	web	in	which	various	elements	are	linked	together,	not	in	a	deductive	system,	but	through	a	series	of	weaker	and	stronger,	more	direct	and	less	direct,	more	obvious	and	not-so-obvious	connections.61		In	a	significant	turn,	this	traditional	view	has	recently	come	under	attack	by	some	of	Leibniz’s	best	and	most	distinguished	commentators.		In	an	important	and	provocative	paper,	Catherine	Wilson	proposes	that	the	search	for	a	coherent	metaphysical	system	in	Leibniz’s	writings	is	ultimately	a	fool’s	errand,	inspired	by	the	eighteenth	century	cult	of	genius	and	a	misunderstanding	of	the	principles	of	interpretative	charity.		In	contrast	to	the	more	traditional	view,	she	suggests	that	a	failure	to	find	systematicity	in	Leibniz’s	writings	need	not	be	a	“subject-based	failure”	grounded	in	“the	inability	of	a	commentator	to	grasp	the	systematicity”	of	Leibniz’s	oeuvre,	but	rather	an	“object–based	failure”	rooted	in	the	facts	that	Leibniz’s	writings	do	“not	cohere	to	form	a	systematic	unit”	and	that	he	never	“tells	an	interpretative	story	that	is	consistent	…	in	the	sense	that	it	contains	no	deep	and	serious	contradictions.”62		Although	more	inclined	to	see	Leibniz’s	views	on	central	metaphysical	themes	as	progressing	throughout	his	career,	Daniel	Garber	has,	in	a	similar	vein,	recently	cautioned	that	“it	is	a	distortion	to	want	to	see	more	order	and	connection	in	Leibniz’s	thought	than	is	really	there,”	and	has	suggested,	as	an	alternative	to	Serres’s	net	analogy,	that	Leibniz’s	thought	might	perhaps	be	better	likened	to	“the	night	sky,	[with]	some	stars	tightly	clustered	into	galaxies,	some	more	loosely	into	constellations,	but	some	shining	independently,	isolated	from	the	others.”63	On	a	first	pass,	Leibniz’s	account	of	monadic	teleology	may	appear	to	lend	support	to	the	increasingly	popular	view	of	Leibniz	as	a	brilliant,	but	not	deeply	systematic	philosopher.		It	is	not	easy	to	see	how	monads	might	be	subject	to	both	the	laws	of	objective	and	subjective	teleology.		How	monads	might	be	causally	autonomous,	always	be	inclined	to	what	they	perceive	to	be	the	best,	and	yet	plunge	into	sudden	bouts	of	pain	and	misery.		Nor	is	it	obvious	how	the	rich	mental	lives	and	the	use	of	reason	that	Leibniz	ascribes	to	sophisticated	
                                                61	M.	Serres,	Le	Système	de	Leibniz,	Paris	1968,	pp.	7-90.	See	also	D.	Garber,	“Leibniz	and	the	Foundations	of	Physics:		The	Middle	Years,”	in:	Kathleen	Okruhlik	and	James	Brown	(eds.),	The	Natural	Philosophy	of	Leibniz,	Dordrecht	1985,	p.	73.	62	C.	Wilson,	“The	Illusory	Nature	of	Leibniz’s	System,”	in:	Rocco	Gennaro	and	Charles	Huenemann	(eds.),	New	Essays	on	the	Rationalists,	New	York	1999,	pp.	373-388.	Cf.	G.	Hartz,	Leibniz’s	Final	System:		Monads,	Matter	and	Animals,	New	York	2007,	pp.	14-18.			63	The	set	up	of	this	conclusion,	my	own	recent	thinking	about	the	systematicity	of	Leibniz’s	philosophy	more	generally,	was	prompted	by	my	response	to	D.	Garber,	“Metaphysics	and	Theology:	The	Role	of	the	Monadology	in	Leibniz's	
Essais	de	Théodicée,”	presented	at	a	conference	entitled	Leibniz's	Theodicy:	
Context	and	Content	hosted	by	the	University	of	Notre	Dame	in	September	of	2010.		It	should	be	noted	that	Garber	has	since	moderated	his	position	concerning	the	systematicity	of	Leibniz’s	work.		His	astronomical	metaphor	nonetheless	brings	out	rather	elegantly,	I	think,	a	quite	natural	and	tempting	view	of	Leibniz’s	thinking.		
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monads	are	to	be	reconciled	with	his	psychological	foundation	of	tiny	inclinations	and	petite	perceptions.		And	if	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	the	threads	of	Leibniz’s	treatment	of	finite	agency	might	themselves	be	coherently	woven	together,	it	is	admittedly	even	harder	to	see	how	they	might	be	tied	into	other	aspects	of	his	far-ranging	thought.		How	they	might	be	related	to,	for	example,	his	much-vaunted	work	in	mathematics	and	the	natural	sciences.		It	is	indeed	tempting	to	conclude	that	Leibniz’s	thinking	about	finite	agency	represents	at	best	a	loose	array	of	semi-consistent	theses	developed	in	perhaps	fortunate	isolation	from	his	other	more	promising	studies.			The	aim	of	the	present	essay,	of	course,	has	been	to	suggest	that	there	are,	after	all,	good	reasons	for	remaining	optimistic	with	respect	to	both	the	internal	coherence	of	Leibniz’s	views	on	human	agency	and	their	systematic	relation	to	other	areas	of	his	thought.		Towards	that	end,	it	has	been	argued	most	centrally	that	attention	to	Leibniz’s	notion	of	an	optimal	form	shows	how	many	of	the	apparent	tensions	in	his	treatment	of	finite	agency	may	be	resolved:	how	monads	might	always	will	what	seems	best	to	them	individually	and	what	is	in	fact	best	for	the	world	as	a	whole;	how	finite	spirits	might	remain	imperfect	and	miserable	even	as	they	continually	strive	in	causal	isolation	for	what	seems	best	to	them	given	their	unique	perspectives	and	limitations;	how	reason	might	play	a	substantive	role	even	in	minds	determined	to	unfold	in	accordance	with	their	immediate	perceptions	and	appetites.		In	arguing	that	there	are	important	parallels	between	Leibniz’s	treatment	of	finite	agency	and	his	handling	of	central	problems	in	the	natural	sciences,	including	the	paradigmatic	problem	of	determining	the	shape	of	the	catenary,	the	present	paper	has	also	aimed	to	bring	out	some	hidden	connections	between	some	of	Leibniz’s	seemingly	most	distant	studies.		In	doing	so,	it	may	hope	to	lend	a	measure	of	support	to	the	hoary,	if	embattled	view	of	Leibniz	as	one	of	the	great	system	builders	of	the	early	modern	period.				
